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THE PARADOX OF PRIVATE POLICING
ELIZABETH E. JOH*
INTRODUCTION
"Most people think of security as some unarmed fat guy that can't speak English at
the 7-Eleven .... That's not us at all. We're very policelike, even though we are secu-
rity officers."
-Security guard employed by Intervention Agency, a security firm.
Those who worry about the encroaching powers of the public police in
the war against terrorism ignore an equally important group. Increasingly,
the private police are considered the first line of defense in the post-
September 11 th world.2 Hardly anything is known about the private police,
yet they are by far the largest provider of policing services in the United
States, at least triple the size of the public police. More importantly, the
functions, responsibilities, and appearance of the private and public police
are increasingly difficult to tell apart. This development has been surpris-
ingly underappreciated. What's more, the law recognizes a nearly absolute
distinction between public and private. This means that private police are
largely unburdened by the law of constitutional criminal procedure or by
state regulation. While the law multiplies distinctions between private and
public police, the two groups perform many of the same tasks, and private
. Acting Professor of Law, University of California, at Davis (King Hall) (ee-
joh@ucdavis.edu). J.D., Ph.D. (Law and Society), New York University; B.A., Yale Uni-
versity. Thanks to Paul Chevigny, David Garland, Charles Reichmann, David Sklansky and
Jerome Skolnick for their comments and suggestions, to the staff of the U.C. Davis Law Li-
brary, and Rachael Phillips ('05) for research assistance, to the Open Society Institute's So-
ros Justice Fellowships for early support; and to Dean Rex Perschbacher and the U.C. Davis
Law School for financial assistance and institutional support.
1 Bud Hazelkorn, Making Crime Pay, S.F. CHRON. MAG., Aug. 17, 2003, at 14, 17.
2 See, e.g., Mimi Hall, Private Security Guards are Homeland's Weak Link, USA
TODAY, Jan. 23, 2003, at IA, available at 2003 WL 5303940 (noting that private guards are
"the first line of defense against terrorism"); accord Service Employees International Union,
Safer Buildings For A Safer America, available at http://www.seiu.org/building/security (last
visited Mar. 5, 2004).
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police benefit from heavy public involvement. This is the paradox of pri-
vate policing.
Private police long ago outpaced the public police in terms of persons
employed and dollars spent. Today they provide crime control and order
maintenance services in many of the places in which we work and live.
Uniformed guards patrol shopping malls, "gated communities," and even
public streets.3  Employers routinely hire private investigative agencies to
conduct background checks on prospective employees. 4 Many of these pri-
vately paid police behave like public law enforcement officers: detaining
individuals, conducting searches, investigating crimes, and maintaining or-
der. Because few empirical studies exist, the private police remain largely
unknown. Courts have not developed comprehensive rules governing pri-
vate police, and statutory regulation is minimal, even non-existent in some
states.5 To make matters worse, legal scholars-especially those who study
the public police-have paid them hardly any attention.6
3 See, e.g., Wall Street Garage Parking Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 2004 WL 727069, at
*6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2004) (granting a preliminary injunction to the owner of a park-
ing garage affected by searches by private police forces on public streets within a security
zone established by the N.Y.P.D.).
4 See, e.g., Karen Dybis, Firms Go High-Tech to Screen Applicants, DET. NEWS, June 22,
2004, at IA (reporting popularity of private screening services used to check prospective
employees).
5 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Maahs & Craig Hemmens, Guarding the Public: A Statutory
Analysis of State Regulation of Security Guards, 21 J. CRIME & JUST. 119, 119 (1998)
("What passes for regulation in some states is little more than asking applicants to promise
that they are qualified to be a security guard.").
6 Law school casebooks devote, if at all, only a few pages to private police. For exam-
ple, see RONALD ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 616-17 (2001), with
1500+ textual pages but only two pages on the private police. The small body of legal
scholarship on private policing focuses almost exclusively on the applicability of the state
action doctrine of federal constitutional law. Most of this scholarship has been limited to
work by law students and recent law school graduates. See, e.g., Heather Barr, More Like
Disneyland: State Action, 42 U.S. C. § 1983, and Business Improvement Districts in New
York, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 393 (1997); Steven Euller, Private Security and the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 649 (1980); Gloria G. Dralla et al., Comment,
Who's Watching the Watchman? The Regulation, or Non-Regulation of America's Law En-
forcement Institution, The Private Police, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 433 (1975); Lynn M.
Gagel, Comment, Stealthy Encroachments Upon the Fourth Amendment: Constitutional
Constraints and Their Applicability to the Long Arm of Ohio's Private Security Forces, 63
U. CN. L. REV. 1807 (1995); Note, Private Assumption of the Police Function Under the
Fourth Amendment, 51 B.U. L. REV. 464 (1971); Note, Private Police Forces: Legal Powers
and Limitations, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 555 (1970); Note, Regulation of Private Police, 40 S.
CAL. L. REV. 540 (1966); Comment, Shoplifting Law: Constitutional Ramifications of Mer-
chant Detention Statutes, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 295 (1973). David Sklansky's 1999 article,
The Private Police, is an important exception. Sklansky presents the most comprehensive
legal discussion of private policing to date. His article does not discuss many of the issues
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This Article begins to remedy that ignorance, by drawing a contrast
between the rigid legal conception of the private police, on the one hand,
and their increasingly complicated and shifting social role on the other.
Drawing upon materials from ethnographic observation, sociology, and law,
this Article argues that private police participate in much of the policing
work that their public counterparts do. Although every private police
agency may not perform all the tasks that a public police department does,
many do, and private police in the aggregate unquestionably perform all of
these duties. This apparently simple observation warrants reconsideration
of the private police by courts and academics. Their common legal charac-
terization as mere "night watchmen," is both dated and inadequate.7
Exactly what constitutes "policing" and who may legitimately call
themselves "police" are now contested issues. As a consequence, the regu-
latory framework governing the police, by giving insufficient consideration
to these increasingly unsettled questions, creates legal distinctions at odds
with actual police work. Furthermore, the contemporary proposition that
private police ought to serve as partners with public police in a common
enterprise of crime prevention must be met with caution, for these partner-
ships carry unresolved questions as to the proper balance of burdens, bene-
fits, and controls that are distributed between the public and private sec-
tors.9
How stark is the contrast that I have drawn? Consider the following
example. A store clerk in a Florida town alerted a police officer, named
Morgan, that he had seen several counterfeit fifty-dollar bills redeemed that
morning. In response, Morgan alerted nearby shopkeepers, and then ob-
served Thomas Francoeur pass one such counterfeit bill. Followed by
Morgan, Francoeur completed his transaction and then met with two associ-
ates, Jack Pacheco and Robert Pizio. After summoning a fellow officer,
Morgan stopped the three men, showed them his badge, and told them to
follow him to his office. Once there, another officer, Schmidt, examined a
book one of the detained men had turned over, and found inside nine coun-
terfeit fifty-dollar bills. The three men also surrendered plane tickets bear-
ing false names, and a key to a room in a local motel, in which police later
found hotel receipts with the same false identities. While in custody,
raised here, however, including situating the analysis within the theoretical literature on po-
licing, and discussing the patterns of cooperation between public and private police organi-
zations. See generally David Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1165 (1999).
For further discussion, see infra Part III.A. 1.
7 See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.




Francoeur, Pacheco, and Pizio stood behind a one-way mirror so that shop
employees could identify them. The three men were later convicted of
passing counterfeit currency and conspiracy.l0
Officers Morgan and Schmidt were private police officers; their juris-
diction, Disney World. Though Morgan's behavior differed little from that
of a public police officer, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals thought other-
wise, and in 1977 rejected Francoeur's claims that Morgan and Schmidt had
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. In its view, Disney World was "an
amusement park to which admission is charged.... No one is permitted
into the outer gates of Disney World except by consent of its owners.""
Disney World was not a community, according to the court, and conse-
quently, Morgan was not like a police officer responsible for that commu-
nity. While the court offered few facts about the Disney police department,
today the eight-hundred member security force of Disney World, solely re-
sponsible for patrolling the hundreds of acres of Disney property, answers
911 calls, and investigates crimes up until the point of arrest.' 2 Officers
Morgan and Schmidt looked like police, behaved like police, but in the
view of the Francoeur court, were not "real" police.
Twenty years later, a Florida state court characterized Disney police
just as the Francoeur court had. In Sipkema v. Reedy Creek Improvement
District,'3 the parents of Rob Sipkema, invoking the Florida Public Records
Act, sued Reedy Creek, a holding company managed by the Disney Corpo-
ration, 14 to obtain copies of the operations manual used by Disney police.
A high speed chase conducted by Disney police led to an accident resulting
in Sipkema's death. '5 While the appellate court summarily affirmed the
trial court's refusal to require Disney to produce the records, Judge Harris,
in a concurring opinion, provided a glimpse into one judge's view of the
Disney police. These employees issued only "Mickey Mouse ... citations,"
and provided "night watchman" rather than "law enforcement" services.
10 United States v. Francoeur, 547 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 894.
12 See CARL HIAASEN, TEAM RODENT: How DISNEY DEVOURS THE WORLD 27-37 (1998)
(describing private policing of Disney World).
'" 697 So. 2d 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
'4 See HIAASEN, supra note 12, at 26 ("Everybody in Orlando knows that Reedy Creek is
Disney and Disney is Reedy Creek.").
15 Id. at 31-35; see also Kent Wetherell, Florida Law Because of and According to
Mickey: The "Top 5" Florida Cases and Statutes involving Walt Disney World, 4 FLA.
COASTAL L.J. 1, 20-22 (2002).
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Therefore, they could not be considered government entities for purposes of
the state public records law. 
16
More than twenty-five years after Francoeur was decided, the Fifth
Circuit's view of private policing remains the dominant one in American
legal thinking. From this standpoint, only public employees paid by tax
dollars, and no one else, are the police. 17 This Article explains how this in-
accurate assessment produces a tension between law and police practices, as
well as opportunities for exploiting that tension.
Consideration of private policing poses some preliminary questions:
defining more precisely the term "private policing," and distinguishing pri-
vate from public policing. Accordingly, Part I provides a definition and the
socio-legal context for the following parts.'
8
Relying principally on a case study, Part II demonstrates three points
about the present state of private policing. First, the advocacy of private-
public partnerships creates incentives for ever greater involvement between
the two policing groups. Second, as that case study shows, meaningful dis-
16 Sipkema, 697 So. 2d at 882 (emphases added). Judge Harris described in more detail
the nature of Disney policing operations:
Disney issues only Mickey Mouse traffic citations. Such citations are issued only to Disney em-
ployees, in order to encourage them to obey the speed limits and to otherwise drive safely on
Disney property. The citations have no force of law-no fines are authorized and no points are
assessed. The citations are placed in the employee's personnel file for appropriate action based
on the number and severity of the violations. Non-employees may be stopped by Disney security
employees in order for the employees to caution such persons to slow down or otherwise drive
more safely, but citations are not issued to non-employees. The actions of repeat or continuing
non-employees offenders are reported to deputies of the Orange County Sheriffs Department.
This is no more law enforcement than the action of one asking his teenage neighbor to slow
down while driving in the neighborhood because there are small children playing.
Id.
17 For further discussion of the contrasting legal status of public and private police, see
infra Part III.
18 I focus primarily on the structure and behavior of private police as they relate to law,
rather than on the culture and institutions within private policing organizations. Accord-
ingly, I do not discuss areas such as individual exercises of authority, the occupational ef-
fects on the daily lives of private police employees, or any subcultures of private policing,
although these areas, which have been studied extensively with respect to public policing,
deserve attention and research. With regard to the public police, there are a number of clas-
sic studies in these areas, including: WILLIAM K. MUIR, POLICE: STREETCORNER POLITICIANS
(1977) (describing dynamics of individual police behavior); ALBERT REISS, THE POLICE AND
THE PUBLIC (1971) (exploring police authority); ELIZABETH REuSS-IANNI, Two CULTURES OF
POLICING: STREET COPS AND MANAGEMENT COPS (1983) (documenting variance in police
subcultures); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966) (exploring the tension
between ideals of legality and bureaucratic efficiency). For an excellent case study examin-
ing the attitudes of "front-line" officers in a Canadian private police company, see GEORGE
RIGAKOS, THE NEW PARAPOLICE 119-46 (2002).
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tinctions between "private" and "public" in private police organizations are
difficult to make. Finally, private police work involves much more than
passive protection of private property. More than ever, private police agen-
cies are sophisticated organizations not dependant on public direction or
aid.
If private policing is complex and varied, the legal framework govern-
ing it is not. Part III examines the law regulating private policing, and
draws attention to the rigid legal distinction between public and private. 9
We can attribute this sharp distinction to at least two presumptions in the
law of (public) policing that obscure private police activity from otherwise
applicable rules. I call one the superficiality of state involvement; the other,
the centrality of arrest. In Part IV, I conclude with the proposal that "polic-
ing" and "the police" are terms with increasingly contestable meanings, and
suggest how private policing forces us to reexamine conventional wisdom
on police and the law.
I. PRIVATE POLICING: WHAT IS PRIVATE AND WHAT IS PUBLIC?
If the sheer size of a social phenomenon is a measure of the need for
increased legal attention, the private police long ago warranted it. Since the
late 1960s, the United States has experienced an explosion in the growth of
companies and individuals providing policing services on a for-profit ba-
sis.2 ° Sociologist Clifford Shearing describes this growth as a "quiet revo-
lution.",2 1 In the 1970s, for example, a report commissioned by the Depart-
ment of Justice estimated that there were approximately 1.4 public police
19 See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1191 (noting that "most persistent complaint" about
private policing is that it is "insufficiently regulated"); see also Maahs & Hemmens, supra
note 5, at 131 ("[C]onsidering the enormous size of the security industry and the authority
invested in security guards, there is surprisingly little state regulation of security guards.");
Phil McCombs, On His Guard, WASH. POST, May 14, 2002, at Cl (referring to "America's
vast, under-regulated rent-a-cop industry").
20 Private policing also has a large, and sometimes greater, presence in other countries.
A recent survey of thirty-seven countries suggests that other countries in the developed
world are experiencing a similar expansion in private police forces that rivals or exceeds the
numbers of their public police. See PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE 157-58, 210, 233
(1995) (describing prevalence and use of private guards in Sao Paulo, Jamaica, and Mexico
City); Jaap De Waard, The Private Security Industry in International Perspective, 7 EUR. J.
CRIM. POL'Y & RES. 143, 152-60 (1999). The ratio of private to public police in post-
apartheid South Africa, for example, is far more dramatic than it is in the United States. See
Michael Kempa et al., Reflections on the Evolving Concept of 'Private Policing', 7 EuR. J.
CRUM. POL'Y & RES. 197, 202 (1999) (noting that private policing growth in South Africa
"outstrips even that of the U.S.").
21 See Clifford D. Shearing, The Unrecognized Origins of the New Policing: Linkages
Between Private and Public Policing, in BUSINESS AND CRIME PREVENTION 224 (Marcus Fel-
son & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 1997).
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officers for every private guard.22 Today, that ratio has reversed direction,
and there are nearly three private guards for every public police officer.23
California alone accounts for 185,000 licensed security guards.24 A number
of estimates suggest that nationwide the money spent on private policing is
at least twice that spent on public policing.25
A. "PRIVATE POLICING": WHAT IS PRIVATE AND WHAT IS PUBLIC?
Much confusion exists regarding what the term "private policing"
means. Does it refer only to security guards? How is it different from pub-
lic policing?
By "private policing" I refer to the various lawful forms of organized,
for-profit personnel services whose primary objectives include the control
of crime, the protection ofproperty and life, and the maintenance of order.
In order to evaluate private policing as a discrete subject of study, we need
to define it generously enough to include more than a few examples, but not
so broadly that we include all forms of social control apart from the public
police.26 As defined here, private policing is distinct from other social
22 WILLIAM C. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., PRIVATE SECURITY TRENDS, 1970 To 2000: THE
HALLCREST REPORT 327 (1990) [hereinafter "HALLCREST REPORT"]; Policing for Profit, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 1997, available at 1997 WL 8136664. The Hallcrest Report, which
contains the most recent and reliable nationwide figures, reported that as of 1990, there were
393,000 proprietary or "in house" guards, and 520,000 "contract" guards. See id. at 185,
196. There is no systematic collection of data on private policing by the federal or state gov-
ernments. Cf SIDRA LEA GIFFORD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND
EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999, at 9 (2002) (explicitly excluding "[p]rivate secu-
rity police" from calculation of national spending and employment of police).
23 This ratio, which is cited throughout the literature on private policing, is based upon a
1990 projection on security guards from the Hallcrest Report. See HALLCREST REPORT, su-
pra note 22, at 229. It does not include others occupations within private policing, such as
private investigators.
24 See Hazelkom, supra note 1, at 16.
25 See, e.g., Policing for Profit, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 1997, available at 1997 WL
8136664 (reporting that $90 billion is spent on private policing and $40 billion spent on pub-
lic police); see HALLCREST REPORT, supra note 22, at 229 (estimating that in 2000, public
and private spending would be $44 and $103 billion). These estimates are at best, however,
a very rough approximation, given the lack of consensus about what counts as private polic-
ing, and the paucity of systematic data collection. A recurring observation in existing studies
of private policing is how little is known of its size and scope. See, e.g., NIGEL SOUTH,
POLICING FOR PROFIT 23 (1988) (noting that "[t]he only consistent and reliable statement that
is continually made about the size and scope of the private security industry today is that it is
hard to obtain consistent and reliable information about it"); Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1277
("[W]e know less today about private policing than we knew in 1930 about public law en-
forcement.").
26 Cf TREVOR JONES & TIM NEWBURN, PRIVATE SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICING 17
(1998) (choosing to focus "on something more specific than policing defined as all 'social
2004]
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groups and activities, outside of public law enforcement, that also play
some role in controlling crime and maintaining order. Throughout Ameri-
can history, groups of private citizens have organized themselves to enforce
their own interpretations of law, but vigilantism is distinct from private po-
licing in its extralegal status.27 Volunteers in neighborhood block-watches
and citizen patrols may be more likely to follow the law, but for them polic-
ing is not a primary occupation, as it is for private police.28 Similarly,
crime control and safety is only a secondary concern to persons such as in-
surance adjusters, garage attendants, or janitors, who may be required, as a
part of their duties, to engage in some police-like activity. 29 And what of
private armies? The provision of private employees in international peace-
keeping missions and conflicts is more accurately described as quasi-
military work, not the domestic activities with which we associate public
policing, my primary point of comparison. 30 Finally, locks and alarms pro-
control,' or than policing defined as 'governance' or the provision of guarantees of secu-
rity").
27 See, e.g., RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF
AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM 95-96 (1975).
28 Some researchers on private policing have classified volunteers together with com-
mercial providers of policing. See, e.g., LES JOHNSTON, THE REBIRTH OF PRIVATE POLICING
137-58 (1992) (discussing the concept of "responsible citizenship"). Admittedly, some ex-
amples raise the question of whether there is any clear boundary between volunteer and for-
profit policing. See, e.g., Vanessa Thomas, Broader Policing, with Citizen Volunteers,
BUFF. NEWS, Feb. 6, 2004, at Al (reporting on the patrols of the Buffalo Special Police, who
are volunteers wearing blue uniforms and badges, and who carry firearms, batons, and pep-
per spray); see also Williams v. Great S. Lumber Co., 277 U.S. 19, 22 (1928) (describing
volunteer group comprised of "business and professional men... [organized] for the pur-
pose of assisting the city authorities in maintaining law and order" and sworn in as special
police). This expansion of "policing" is not a helpful one, for it blurs any distinction be-
tween policing as an occupation and all forms of non-state social control, which can include
not just block-watches but also crime precautions taken by teachers and parents, for exam-
ple. To be sure, volunteer efforts and private policing are both part of a contemporary effort
by government to encourage "responsibilization" strategies. For further discussion of this
trend, see David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445,
452 (1996).
29 Bruce George and Mark Button, in their study of private policing in the U.K., refer to
such persons as "occupations with significant security activity," including caretakers at uni-
versities, parking garage attendants, and receptionists. See BRUCE GEORGE & MARK
BUTTON, PRIVATE SECURITY 118-19 (2000).
30 See, e.g., P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY
INDUSTRY (2003) (discussing growth of private corporations offering military services); Sam
Dagher, Iraq Turns Into Bonanza for World's Private Security Firms, AGENCE FRENCE-
PRESSE, Dec. 28, 2003 (describing Iraq as a "magnet for veterans of guerrilla wars in Africa,
Latin America and Northern Ireland," as well as American public police); Andrew Higgins,
Contract Cops: As It Wields Power Abroad, US. Outsources Law and Order Work, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 2, 2004, at Al (describing federal contract with DynCorp to provide security in
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tect property and promise security, but the use of these goods is both too
episodic and too widespread throughout society to be contained within a
discrete definition of policing, let alone private policing.
We should recognize, however, that the definition of private policing
here serves to sharpen the object of analysis, and not to draw absolute
boundaries between that which is or is not "private policing" and more gen-
erally, "policing." Much social action, broadly interpreted, might be con-
sidered policing, so line-drawing exercises are unlikely to be successful
here. As the following parts suggest, the story of the private police role in
society is also a debate about the boundaries of policing itself, and thus it is
my hope to let the problematic character of "policing" permeate the discus-
sion that follows.
B. STUDYING THE PUBLIC POLICE
Who are the public police? For many, the "police" are armed, uni-
formed public servants charged with enforcing the criminal law. To this we
might add that they are members of a "bureaucracy created by political and
legislative processes," and are also expected to "maintain public order," or
to keep the peace.31 In democratic societies, police are accountable to the
courts, and to elected legislatures and executives.32 The employment of the
term "private police" necessarily implies a definition in contrast to the pub-
lic police. How is each group distinct from the other?
In order to draw a comparison, the student of private policing must be
acquainted with the sociological and legal literature pertaining to the public
police. Consider the interplay between the formal rules regulating public
police behavior and observations made of public police organizations in ac-
tion. The public police are formally charged with the enforcement of
criminal laws and the prevention and detection of crime. 33 States define by
Iraq); Eugene B. Smith, The New Condottieri and U.S. Policy: The Privatization of Conflict
and Its Implications, PARAMETERS, Winter 2002-03, at 104-05 (discussing emergence of the
"private military corporation" as a "a legally chartered company or corporation organized
along business lines and engaged in military operations across the spectrum of conflict"); cf
Kempa, supra note 20, at 214 (describing the United States as the "largest exporter" of over-
seas private security for international peacekeeping functions).
31 See Jerome H. Skolnick, Policing, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL &
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 11535 (2001).
32 See id.
33 The New York Police Department, for instance, offers the following mission state-
ment: "The Mission of the New York City Police Department is to enhance the quality of
life in our City by working in partnership with the community and in accordance with consti-
tutional rights to enforce the laws, preserve the peace, reduce fear, and provide for a safe en-
vironment." See N.Y. Police Dept., About NYPD, at http://www.nyc.gov/htm/nypd/htmU
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statute who may be classified as a public police officer, or in the parlance of
some statutes, a "peace officer., 34  This designation identifies who may
stop, detain, search, and arrest persons under the special legal powers that
states confer upon the public police.35
The formal obligation to enforce the law fully is not borne out in prac-
tice, however.36 Patrol officers possess considerable discretion, in deciding
both when and whether to enforce the law (as well as in the exercise of their
peacekeeping function).37 Because no police department exists with enough
time or personnel to meet formal enforcement goals, police officers rely in-
stead upon "priorities of enforcement., 38  As for the goal of preventing
mission.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2003); see also MARK S. DAVIS, THE CONCISE
DICTIONARY OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 198 (2002) (defining police as "officials whose respon-
sibility is to enforce criminal laws and ensure public safety").
34 See WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.7(f) (2004).
35 See id; see also Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1187 (noting that public police, unlike or-
dinary private citizens, have special powers to apply for and execute warrants, conduct
searches without a warrant in some circumstances, and to command the assistance of by-
standers); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 833 (2004) (permitting peace officers to search "any
person for whom he has legal cause to arrest, whenever he has reasonable cause to believe
that the person possesses a dangerous weapon"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 833.5(a) (2004) (per-
mitting detention by peace officer in cases where the officer has reasonable cause to believe
that person suspected possesses a "deadly weapon"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 835a (2004) (per-
mitting "reasonable force" by peace officer to effect arrest, or to overcome resistance when
reasonable cause exists to believe that a person has committee a "public offense").
36 See THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, THE KERNER REPORT: THE
1968 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 312 (Pantheon
Books 1988) (1968) ("Formally, the police officer has no discretion; his task is to enforce the
law at all times .... Informally-and in reality-the officer faces an entirely different situa-
tion.").
37 See, e.g., Albert Reiss, Jr., Police Organization in the Twentieth Century, in MODERN
POLICING 51, 74 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992) (noting that "[a]lthough the
foundation of policing is the legal order and its rules, police officers, nevertheless, have
enormous discretionary powers to apply the law").
38 See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low-visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 561 (1960). By
contrast, Goldstein defines "full enforcement" as follows:
(1) the investigation of every disturbing event which is reported to or observed by them and
which they have reason to suspect may be a violation of the criminal law; (2) following a deter-
mination that some crime has been committed, and effort to discover its perpetrators; and (3) the
presentation of all information collected by them to the prosecutor for his determination of the
appropriateness of further invoking the criminal process.
Id. at 559-60; see also KENNETH CULl' DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 166 (1975) (observing
that "selective enforcement" results from a conflict between the expectation to enforce the
law fully and the lack of resources to do so).
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crime, an objective of the very first public police,39 the police remain
largely reactive: attending to crime after the fact, on the basis of citizen
complaints.40
Although the public, and even officers themselves, perceive crime-
fighting as the most important task of the public police,41 the average patrol
officer devotes only a small portion of his or her working day to solving or
preventing crime.42 Instead, patrol officers spend the greatest portion of
their time engaged in maintaining order, or peacekeeping; they "interrupt
and pacify situations of potential or angry conflict.' '43 The order that the
police keep, or as Richard Ericson revises, "reproduce," 4 is the result of
various factors: police officer attitudes, public expectations, and the "situ-
ational exigencies" of individual encounters between officer and citizen.45
The public criminal law is a but not the resource for determining police be-
havior.46 This is especially true at the level of the individual officer. So-
cially and physically isolated in his work, the patrol officer is informed as
much by his "working personality"-a combination of danger, authority,
and accountability to superiors-as he is by the law.47 In addition to crime
control and order maintenance, the public police also are responsible for
regulatory duties such as towing away illegally parked cars and issuing
permits for parades.48
39 See, e.g., T.A. CRITCHLEY, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 900-1966, at
52 (1967).
40 See ALBERT REISS, THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 63-120 (1971) (discussing how citizen
complaints mobilize police behavior); see also Peter W. Greenwood & Joan Petersilia, The
Criminal Investigation Process: Volume I: Summary and Policy Recommendations, in WHAT
WORKS IN POLICING 71 (David H. Bayley ed., 1998).
41 See EGON BITTNER, Urban Police, in ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK 19, 20-21 (1990).
42 See DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 17 (1994) (arguing that perhaps a
quarter of a patrol officer's time is spent on crime fighting).
41 See id. at 19. Additionally, Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty argue that today's
public police play a significant role in recording and organizing information related to risk
assessment, such as car theft data for insurance claims. See RICHARD V. ERICSON & KEVIN
D. HAGGERTY, POLICING THE RISK SOCIETY 7-9 (1997).
44 See RICHARD ERICSON, REPRODUCING ORDER: A STUDY OF POLICE PATROL WORK 7
(1982).
45 Egon Bittner provides an often-cited definition of public policing as "a mechanism for
the distribution of non-negotiably coercive force employed in accordance with the dictates of
an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies." See Egon Bittner, The Functions of the Police
in Modern Society, in ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK 89, 131 (1990).
46 See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 227-77 (1968) (explain-
ing how "political culture" influences police department behavior and attitudes).
47 See SKOLNICK, supra note 18, at 42-70.
48 See BITTNER, supra note 41, at 23.
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In sum, sociological studies of the public police have shown that their
popular characterization as "law enforcers" is only partially correct. Polic-
ing, even for the public police, encompasses a much greater variety of ac-
tion (and inaction) than might be first assumed.
These general observations, however, go only partway towards charac-
terizing the attitudes, functions, and operation of any particular police de-
partment. American policing is a highly local and decentralized (or, "bal-
kanized,") 49 institution.50 There are federal, state, county, and city police, 51
as well as police with special jurisdictions, like the Florida Game and Fresh
Water Fish Commission, and the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Au-
thority.52 The priorities and mission of any one police department depend
highly on a variety of factors that include its leadership, local politics, the
professional culture of the police, and the outlook of the community that the
department serves. 53 Historians of American public policing have demon-
strated repeatedly that the "[public] police were never fully controlled from
the outside or above. 54
Overlaying the complex world of ordinary police work is a high degree
of legal regulation, much of which has been "constitutionalized." Most im-
portantly, limitations set by judicial interpretation of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution shape the ability of public po-
lice to detain, arrest, question, and use force in their interactions with the
public." These constraints are enforced indirectly by rules of evidentiary
exclusion in the trials of criminal defendants. The exclusion of otherwise
relevant evidence from a criminal defendant's trial has a two-fold impact,
by undermining the prosecution's case and by implicitly deterring future il-
legality on the part of the police. More directly, public police officers may
themselves be civil or criminal defendants on the basis of alleged miscon-
duct. Most claims of this nature against the public police arise under the
49 William A. Geller & Norval Morris, Relations Between Federal and Local Police, in
MODERN POLICING, supra note 37, at 231-32.
50 American policing has been locally controlled since its establishment during the mid-
nineteenth century. See generally ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG CITY POLICE (1977); JAMES
RICHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1901 (1970).
51 The majority of police are provided by local governments. See Reiss, supra note 37, at
61-62.
52 Each employs hundreds of police officers. See MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2000 (2003).
53 See, e.g., ERICSON, supra note 44, at 30 (noting that police "operate within a frame-
work of rules emanating from the community and legal and police organizations").
54 See Roger Lane, Urban Police and Crime in Nineteenth-Century America, in MODERN
POLICING, supra note 37, at 20.
55 See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1183.
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federal civil rights laws.56 But the public police are also subject to suit un-
der state tort laws, 57 as well as to criminal prosecution under federal or state
law,58 although criminal cases are rarely pursued.59
As a working definition, then, the term "public police" refers to those
bureaucratically organized, professionally trained public employees en-
trusted with the tasks of enforcing the criminal law and maintaining order,
backed by the authority of the state, paid by public funds, and accountable
to democratic institutions.
C. REFINING THE PRIVATE POLICE DEFINITION
By contrast, the boundaries of private policing are much less clear, in
part because there has been so little scholarly attention, and because there is
no equivalent to criminal procedure law governing them.6° Because "there
is a growing lack of consensus as to what exactly the 'private policing' con-
struct entails, ' 61 what is and is not defined as "private policing" here is not
without contest.62 We can attribute some of the disagreement to the fact
that private police are employed in a variety of different contexts: acting as
bodyguards, patrolling property, investigating fraud, and maintaining order.
Another source of confusion is the range of organizational formS.6 3 Some
private police are employees of large, publicly-held multinational corpora-
tions, while others are solo practitioners. All, however, share a common
purpose: to pursue their clients' objectives.
56 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (2004); see also MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE
MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION I-I (3d ed. 2003) (observing that the largest number of
public police misconduct cases are brought as § 1983 claims).
57 See Matthew Hess, Good Cop Bad Cop, Reassessing the Legal Remedies for Police
Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149, 188.
58 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (2004) (providing for criminal prosecution for both
conspiracy to violate and for violations of federal civil rights).
59 See Hess, supra note 57, at 177-187.
60 See, e.g., GEORGE & BUTTON, supra note 29, at 3 (noting that there are "only a handful
of academics interested in private policing"); RIGAKOS, supra note 18, at 5 (observing that
although academic interest in private policing dates back to the 1970s, the literature is
"sparse" and "relatively few scholars" are involved).
61 Kempa, supra note 20, at 198.
62 See, e.g., HALLCREST REPORT, supra note 22, at 122 ("What is private security? Unfor-
tunately there is no generally accepted definition of private security; in fact there is consider-
able disagreement.").
63 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming
2005) (presenting a typology of private policing).
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A client-driven mandate is perhaps the most central characteristic of
private policing.64  Clients' particular substantive needs-the kinds of
losses and injuries for which they seek policing services-shape the charac-
ter of the private policing employed.65 Thus, what counts as deviant, disor-
derly, or simply unwanted behavior for private police organizations is de-
fined not in moral terms but instrumentally, by a client's particular aims,
66such as a pleasant shopping experience or an orderly work environment.
To pursue these substantive ends, private police organizations often
turn to four methods of policing, as discussed by Clifford Shearing.67 First,
private police agencies focus on loss instead of crime. Loss is distinctive
because it is concerned with a wider scope of activity than crime, such as
accidents and errors. The emphasis on loss also means that private police
are disengaged from the moral underpinnings of the criminal law; they fo-
cus instead on property and asset protection.68 Second, private police stress
preventive means over detection and apprehension to control crime and dis-
order. Because private police clients are concerned not so much with the
punishment of individual wrongdoers but the disruption of routine activity
(e.g., a smoothly functioning workplace), policing efforts focus heavily on
surveillance.69
When prevention fails, however, private police often can turn to a third
means: private justice systems. 70  These are functional alternatives to the
public police and the criminal justice system. Multiple incentives exist to
treat matters privately-banning, firing, and fining-instead of pursuing
64 See CLIFFORD D. SHEARING & PHILLIP C. STENNING, PRIVATE SECURITY AND PRIVATE
JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 80s: A REVIEW OF THE POLICY ISSUES 9 (1982); Clifford D.
Shearing, Private Security: Implications for Social Control, in UNDERSTANDING POLICING
521, 531 (K.R.E. McCormick & L.A. Visano eds., 1992).
65 Cf Thomas M. Scott & Marlys McPherson, The Development of the Private Sector of
the Criminal Justice System, 6 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 267, 286 (1971) (observing that a private
police officer is "employed, presumably, to investigate and apprehend the wrongdoer be-
cause the client has suffered a direct loss by virtue of the acts of the wrongdoer").
66 See Shearing, supra note 64, at 531-32.
67 See SHEARING & STENNING, supra note 64, at 7.
68 See Shearing, supra note 64, at 531-32.
69 See Clifford D. Shearing & Phillip C. Stenning, Say "Cheese!".: The Disney Order
That Is Not So Mickey Mouse, in PRIVATE POLICING 317, 323 (Clifford D. Shearing & Phillip
C. Stenning eds., 1987).
70 See Stuart Henry, Private Justice and the Policing of Labor: The Dialectics of Indus-
trial Discipline, in PRIVATE POLICING, supra note 69, at 45-46 (defining private justice as
"localized nonstate systems of administering and sanctioning individuals accused of rule-
breaking or disputing within groups or organizations"). I define private justice to include
also formal legal means outside of the criminal law, including civil recovery statutes, which
are discussed further infra Part III.B.3.
[Vol. 95
THE PARADOX OF PRIVATE POLICING
prosecution.7' In a private justice system, the resolution of problems is left
to the control and discretion of private police and their clients, who may see
some incidents as unworthy of the lost time and resources necessary to as-
sist in a public prosecution.72 As a consequence, some private police clients
choose to tolerate some kinds and amounts of deviance. 73 In addition, pub-
lic police organizations may lack the resources to investigate or assign a dif-
ferent priority to some matters, such as shoplifting, that some private police
agencies and their clients see as serious problems.
Finally, Shearing identifies a close link between the growth of private
police and the emergence of "mass private property., 74 The term refers to
large spaces, such as malls and "corporate campuses," that are privately
owned but functionally public or quasi-public. They are quasi-public be-
cause, while nominally private, people use them as they do more traditional
public spaces: the town square, the sidewalk, and the commons. While
public police traditionally have assumed responsibility for the policing of
public spaces, private police have presumptive control over private prop-
erty.75 Thus, the mass private property concept identifies a change in the
71 For example, a recent lawsuit against Macy's department stores alleged that the store's
private punishment for shoplifting included permanent exclusion from the store for a period
of seven years. See First Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief and Monetary Damages at 28, Simmons-Thomas v. Macy's East, Inc., No. 03-CV-
3625 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2003) (on file with author).
72 See, e.g., HALLCREST REPORT, supra note 22, at 27, 299-300; JAMES S. KAKALIK &
SORREL WILDHORN, PRIVATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 60 (1971); Stuart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 445, 450-51 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986).
73 Recently, Greyhound Bus Lines security guards in Tennessee revealed that they rou-
tinely release persons who have been found with small amounts of drugs on their persons.
One guard stated that they often "flush the drugs down the toilet, and let passengers continue
traveling on their route." The public police were notified, according to the Greyhound
guards, only when the quantity of drugs found warranted a felony charge. The company ini-
tially denied that such discretion was available to its private police officers, and then, shortly
after its denial, issued new guidelines stating that Greyhound station managers should seek
guidance from local public police departments to develop policies regarding the discovery of
illegal drugs. See Christian Bottorff, After Incident Here, Greyhound Changes Policy on
Illegal Items, THE TENNESSEAN, June 16, 2004, at 1; Greyhound Guards Sometimes Let Drug
Offenders Go, Assoc. PRESS NEWSWIRES, June 12, 2004.
74 See Shearing, supra note 64, at 526.
75 See, e.g., KAKALIK & WILDHORN, supra note 72, at 18 (contrasting responsibilities);
INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE SECURITY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 85
(1974) (same); Nicholas R. Fyfe, Policing the City, 32 URB. STUD. 759, 767 (1995) (same).
Even these presumptions, though, are changing as some municipalities in Illinois, California,
Maryland, Virginia, and New Jersey have begun to enforce public speeding, parking, and pet
litter laws on private roads and spaces. See Andrew Stark, Arresting Developments: When
Police Power Goes Private, AM. PROSPECT, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 41.
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structure of modem life-where and how Americans live, work, and spend
leisure time-that has led to a more prominent role for private police.
As for their legal status, many private police do not possess the same
legal powers as the public police. Many private security guards, for in-
stance, possess no greater legal capabilities than do ordinary citizens to
forcibly detain persons who are suspected of or have in fact committed a
crime, although there is less distinction between the citizen arrest power and
peace officer arrest power than might be expected.76 For example, in many
states, an ordinary citizen may arrest someone for a misdemeanor commit-
ted in her presence, and for a felony that she has probable cause to believe
that the person has committed (subject to the limitation that a felony has in
fact been committed).77 Even if citizens and private police possess the same
formal powers, the more important difference is a practical one; private po-
lice are occupationally disposed to use powers that a citizen may rarely, if
ever, invoke.
Some private police do possess greater legal powers than ordinary pri-
vate citizens. Deputization confers upon private police the same powers
granted to the public police.78 For example, private police on many college
campuses possess "peace officer" powers while on duty and within the con-
fines of the campus. 79 There are also large numbers of public police work-
ing as private police in their off-hours.8 ° Some of these "moonlighting" po-
lice even work in their public uniforms and drive their public squad cars, all
while on a private payroll.81
76 See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1183-84.
77 See id at 1184; Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant,
49 HARV. L. REV. 566 (1935).
78 The Rand Report define deputization as the "formal method by which federal, state,
and city government grant to specific, named individuals the powers or status of public po-
lice-usually for a limited time and in a limited geographic area." See KAKALIK &
WILDHORN, supra note 72, at 63 (discussing deputization); see also GEORGE O'TOOLE, THE
PRIVATE SECTOR: PRIVATE SPIES, RENT-A-CoPs, AND THE POLICE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 10
(1978) (O'Toole defines deputization as "a process by which some private citizens can be
invested with full or partial police powers (and permitted to) arrest, search, or detain some-
one in circumstances that would constitute false arrest or some other offense by a regular
private guard."); Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1183-84.
79 See, e.g., Valeria L. Brown, Commentary: The Campus Security Act and Campus Law
Enforcement, 70 EDUC. L. REP. 1055, 1058-1062 (1992) (discussing examples of campus
police powers granted by state law).
80 See ALBERT J. REISS, JR., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT OF PUBLIC POLICE 1
(1988) (estimating that approximately 150,000 public police officers work in private police
jobs when off-duty).
81 See Stark, supra note 75 (describing employment of moonlighting police); see also
infra Part II.
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Consequently, it would be a mistake to think of private police as lack-
ing a legal basis from which to exercise coercive power. The private police
also possess some powers that the public police lack.82 Many are author-
ized to act as agents of property, and can rely upon the powers of exclusion
or ejection for those considered undesirable or unwelcome from the malls,
corporate campuses, and other private spaces that are policed privately.
83
Public police may lack these specific powers of exclusion in the places they
serve.
Distinctions more fundamental than formal legal powers exist between
the two groups. Even if the criminal law does not determine their behavior,
public police nevertheless must take into account social and democratic
values that the law represents.84 Public police rely on the criminal law-
with its neutral, universal, and uniform criteria-as a source of legitimacy.85
In his discussion of formal organizations, sociologist Philip Selznick draws
a contrast between "management" and "governance" that is useful here.
86
A management model stresses efficiency and goal-achievement, whereas a
governance model takes into account broader goals of integrity, the ac-
commodation of interests, and morality.87 Public police do possess "bot-
82 See, e.g., Shearing, supra note 64, at 521, 528 ("While modem private security guards
enjoy few or no exceptional law enforcement powers, their status as agents of property al-
lows them to exercise a degree of legal authority which in practice far exceeds that of their
counterparts in the public police.").
83 See id.
84 Compare, for example, the characterizations of public and private presented by the
Advisory Counsel established by the Department of Justice: "Law enforcement agencies
provide a general level of protection and security for the public and serve the public interest
by regulating behavior considered offensive or contrary to the common good of society....
[By contrast,] private security consists of private concerns protecting private property and
interests." PRIVATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE
SECURITY SOURCES AND AREAS OF CONFLICT AND STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 5
(1977).
85 See Albert Reiss, Jr. The Legitimacy of Intrusion into Private Space, in PRIVATE
POLICING 19, 26 (Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenning eds., 1982).
86 PHILLIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PURPOSE
OF COMMUNITY (1992).
87 In the 1936, the Senate Committee on Education and Labor convened a subcommittee
chaired by Robert La Follette, Jr. to investigate the role of private police in strike breaking.
The committee described the public police this way:
Public police systems ... are paid from public treasuries and are expected to be responsive to the
requirements of entire communities. They must perform their duties impartially, without regard
to the economic, racial, or religious status or views of the individual members of the community.
The final responsibility for the actions of public police systems rests in electived representatives
who are accountable to the electorate.
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tom-line" goals, of course; departments focus on their "clearance rates" and
police chiefs must answer to increases in the crime rate. 88 Fundamentally,
however, the public police are an organization that stresses governance; the
private police, management. Legal scholars usually focus most on the pow-
ers formally delegated to police, but one of the more significant distinctions
lies in these basic organizational stances.
"Private" and "public" do not represent concrete distinctions. Many
forms of policing reside somewhere on a continuum between public and
private. Increasingly, it is not obvious whether the police officer walking a
"beat" is governed by a public agency or by a private company. As a rough
approximation, however, the distinctions made here between public polic-
ing and private policing are useful ones.
D. IS THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY DIFFERENT?
Private policing must also be distinguished from the private security
industry: a term used to describe those private companies that provide the
materials necessary for private police work.89 Confusion often arises be-
cause the industry also supplies security personnel, and thus whether these
two terms are identical has provoked a range of responses. Some have
adopted an additional term that incorporates the sense that private policing
is an activity as well as a set of products on the market. 90 Sociologist Nigel
South, for example, in his study of British private policing, suggests the use
of the "private security sector."91
Others have chosen to combine not only private policing and the pri-
vate security industry, but to include the public police also under the gen-
PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS, S. REP No. 76-6, pt. 2, at 2 (1939). For further discussion, see
Elizabeth E. Joh, The Evolving Status of Private Policing (in draft) (2004) (discussing the
importance of the La Follette investigation).
88 See, e.g., SKOLNICK, supra note 18, at 164-81 (describing how police detectives meet
organizational measures of performance by saving and parceling out clearances).
89 There are few reliable means of measuring the private security industry in the United
States. As with private policing, this can be attributed both to disagreement over the defini-
tion of the industry, as well as the practical lack of means to collect data on the industry. For
a discussion of the American private security industry, see the HALLCREST REPORT, supra
note 22, at 163-226. For a comparative look at its British counterpart, see JONES &
NEWBURN, supra note 26, at 54-94.
90 See, e.g., O'TOOLE supra note 78, at xiii ("I mean the term 'Private Sector' to include
any individual or group involved with law enforcement or authority, but lacking official po-
lice authority.").
91 See NIGEL SOUTH, POLICING FOR PROFIT 23 (1988).
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eral term of "policing." Thus, for example, Shearing has chosen this ap-
proach to highlight what he sees as the blurred boundary between private
and public policing.92 There remains no consensus on the boundaries of
private policing or its relationship to the security industry, and each prefer-
ence is highly dependent on the researcher's particular perspective.
There is no one right manner in which to describe the phenomenon,
and the adoption of a particular term should be judged by its usefulness.
My choice here is to use both "private policing" and the "private security
industry" because they represent separate but overlapping categories. The
private security industry refers to the set of for-profit security products and
services, which include three broad categories: the provision of guards,
equipment, and investigation or consulting services. 93 Individuals may pur-
chase goods and services from the industry without necessarily being in-
volved in private policing, as when a homeowner purchases an alarm sys-
tem. Private policing, by contrast, refers to the acquisition and use of these
products and services, as well as the application of specialized knowledge
in areas like crime control, investigation, and risk management. In these
terms, private policing is the set of activities whose needs are partially sup-
plied by the private security industry.94
II. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CONVERGENCE: PARTNERSHIPS
A. THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT OF PARTNERSHIP
To observe the numerical rise in private police is to tell only half of the
story. Just as importantly, today public agencies are increasingly relying
upon private police act as partners with the public police. The popularity
of these partnerships comes at a time when there are doubts about the capa-
92 See Shearing, supra note 21, at 219-30.
93 Public police departments may purchase equipment from the very same companies
that private security companies do, and perhaps the "policing industry" might be a more ac-
curate term than "private security industry." Prison management presents a similar set of
issues. Cf Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 51, 63
(Dec. 1998) ("The prison-industrial complex now includes some of the nation's largest ar-
chitecture and construction firms, Wall Street investment banks that handle prison bond is-
sues and invest in private prisons, plumbing-supply companies, food-service companies,
health-care companies, companies that sell everything from bullet-resistant security cameras
to padded cells available in a 'vast color selection."'). To avoid confusion about general ref-
erences to "policing," however, I use the term "private security industry."
94 As the following Parts demonstrate, it will make more sense to speak of "private polic-
ing" as an activity rather than to "the private police," to the extent that the latter term sug-




bility of government to act as the primary provider of security to the public.
This waning confidence has roots extending well beyond the September
11 th attacks. Private police today find themselves the beneficiaries in the
debate over the responsibility and capability of government to control
crime: a crisis in what David Garland calls the "myth of sovereign crime
control. 95
In a period beginning in the 1960s, governments of the United States
and other western democracies have found themselves in a predicament.
Faced with persistently high crime rates, public officials (in the Department
of Justice, and in the British Home Office, for example) "see the need to
withdraw or at least qualify their claim to be the primary and effective pro-
vider of security and crime control. 96 In a 1976 report on private policing
commissioned by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 97 for
instance, the authors state that "the sheer magnitude of crime in our society
prevents the criminal justice system by itself from adequately controlling
and preventing crime." 98 Similarly, James Stewart, former director of the
National Institute of Justice, declared in 1985 that "the responsibility of
government to ensure security need not necessarily mean that government
must provide all the protective services itself."99 Even voices within the
public police community concede that "cops can't do it alone."'100
95 See Garland, supra note 28, at 448.
96 See id.; Ronald L. Boostrom & Corina Draper, Community Policing, Problem Ori-
ented Policing, Police-Citizen Coproduction of Public Safety, and the Privatization of Crime
Control, in PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM 56, 57 (Gary W. Bowman et
al. eds., 1992) (stating that partnership between public and private sectors "was promoted [in
1980s] as an antidote to the failure of state-monopolized criminal justice").
97 The LEAA was a Federal agency established in 1968 to funnel federal funding to state
and local law enforcement agencies. The agency created state planning agencies, funded
educational programs, research, and a variety of local crime control initiatives, and was abol-
ished in 1982. See Records of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, available at
http://www.archives.gov/research-room/federal-recordsguide/lawenforcementassistance
_administrationrg423.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
98 U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY 18 (1976) (emphasis added).
99 James Stewart, Public Safety and Private Police, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 758, 760
(1985) (emphasis added). Similarly, in a report on private security, the British Home Office
stated: "There is no modem society in which the Government can provide total protection
against crime. It is clearly desirable for individuals and organizations to take sensible pre-
cautions against crime. In our society it is reasonable for them to pay others to provide a
system." See Home Office, THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY: A DISCUSSION PAPER 10
(1979); cf Naoko Yoshida, The Taming of the Japanese Private Security Industry, 9
POLICING AND SOCIETY 241, 242 (1999) ("The Japanese public is no longer content to leave
security issues to the police.").
100 See Ralph Blumenthal, And Now a Private Midtown "Police Force," N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 1989, at B4 (quoting Richard Dillon, a thirty-two-year veteran of the NYPD and
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Official endorsement of private policing as a public resource provided
one important solution to the problem. Beginning in the 1970s, reports
sponsored by the Department of Justice suggested that private police could
provide much-needed aid to the public police, and provided a vocabulary to
describe this emerging position. A 1971 report by the Rand Corporation
was probably the first major national study of several to suggest that private
police could benefit the public generally.' 0 ' Policing, according to the Re-
port, is not necessarily the exclusive dominion of government, but rather




Conventional research on the police had incorporated Max Weber's
definition of the state in terms of its monopoly over legitimate force.,
0 3 Po-
licing, as a part of that monopoly, could not become private. 0 4 The reinter-
pretation of policing in these reports, therefore, was radical. Later studies
took the further step that private police could serve as equal partners with
the public police in the "coproduction of security," rather than simply sub-
ordinates providing a complementary service.' 05
The endorsement of these partnerships in policing represents one as-
pect of the greater reliance today on non-state groups-corporations, houses
of worship, non-profit organizations, and communities106--to assume in-
now heading a private security force); see also Jack R. Greene et al., Merging Public and
Private Security for Collective Benefit: Philadelphia's Center City District, 14 AM. J. POLICE
3, 7 (1995) (observing that there is a "greater awareness that the public police cannot stand
alone in the crime control arena"); Anthony M. Voelker, NYPD's APPL Program: A New
Partnership, 1991 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 1 (Feb. 1991) ("The police cannot
provide all the protection and enforcement necessary to maintain safe and orderly communi-
ties.").
10' Cf Clifford D. Shearing, The Relation between Public and Private Policing, in
MODERN POLICING, supra note 37, at 399, 409 ("In retrospect, RAND's report can be identi-
fied as one of the earliest indications of the shift in political consciousness that has promoted
the privatization of a whole range of services previously seen as fundamentally public.").
102 See KAKALIK & WILDHORN, supra note 72, at 24.
103 See MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION 2 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Milss trans.,
1965) (1946).
104 See DAvID H. BAYLEY & CLIFFORD D. SHEARING, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NEW
STRUCTURE OF POLICING: DESCRIPTION, CONCEPTUALIZATION, AND RESEARCH AGENDA 5
(2001).
105 See HALLCREST REPORT, supra note 22, at 312; see also Joh, supra note 87 (discuss-
ing the change in attitude represented in these and other reports).
106 Because of my focus on the private police, I do not discuss in detail the increasing
expectation that citizens assume some responsibility for their own safety. For an excellent
discussion of the development of partnerships between communities and criminal justice
agencies, see generally ADAM CRAWFORD, THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE OF CRIME (1997).
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creased responsibility for crime prevention. 107 Official discussions of crime
control and prevention today stress greater reliance on responsibility and
self-help, concepts that translate practically into encouraging the creation of
volunteer crime patrols, the purchase of locks and other personal safety
measures, and, as discussed in this Part, the formation of partnerships be-
tween public and private police.'
08
At the same time, this shift in emphasis on the private sector should
not be mistaken for the shrinking of criminal justice agencies. The advo-
cacy of what some have called "responsibilization' 0 9 or "prudentialism"1 0
within the private sphere does not assume that public police departments
will diminish in size. Public police budgets, for example, did not decrease
during the 1990s." ll Nor do we yet know whether the partnerships are actu-
ally more effective than the public police alone in controlling crime and
disorder. Rather, what has changed are the assumptions about the proper
relationship between citizens, corporations, communities, on the one hand,
and the responsibilities of the state on the other. As two police chiefs from
the state of Washington suggest, "[g]one is the stereotype that [public] po-
lice are the guarantors of the ... status quo."
' 12
By end of the 1990s, the language of public-private partnerships per-
meated discussions of public police innovation. A 2000 report published by
the Department of Justice, "Operation Cooperation," counts sixty coopera-
tive programs throughout the country, and suggests that "[n]o city or met-
107 Cf Home Office, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE WAY AHEAD 83 (2001) (noting that "[t]here
has always been a wide range of people contributing to community safety in various forms,
[including]... security guards in shopping centres... and the private security industry").
108 As British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw states: "The Government's commitment to a
partnership approach to tackling crime and disorder has paved the way for the private secu-
rity industry to play a wider role in initiatives to reduce crime and improve community
safety." See GEORGE & BUTTON, supra note 29, at vii.
109 See Garland, supra note 28, at 452.
110 See Pat O'Malley, Risk, Power and Crime Prevention, 21 ECON. & Soc. 252, 257
(1992) (describing prudentialism in part as "the privatization of public benefits as an aspect
of the extension of privatized risk-based technique").
111 Federal spending on police grew from $2,527,000,000 in 1982 to $14,797,000,000 in
1999; state spending from $2,833,000,000 in 1982 to $9,632,000,000 in 1999; and local
spending from $14,172,000,000 in 1982 to $45,593,000,000 in 1999. See SIDRA LEA
GIFFORD, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 1, 3 (2002) (explaining that, even with adjustment for inflation, public expenditures
on policing grew substantially from 1982-1999). But see WILLIAM C. CUNNINGHAM & TODD
H. TAYLOR, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE GROWING ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY 3 (1984) (reporting
that in a survey of law enforcement agencies, forty-four percent of police and sheriff's de-
partments reported the same or fewer personnel in 1981 as five years earlier).
112 Terrence J. Mangan & Michael J. Shanahan, Public Law Enforcement/Private Secu-
rity: A New Partnership?, 59 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 18 (1990).
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ropolitan area should be without at least one." ' 3 The scope and size of the
programs vary, ranging from the thirty members of the Northeast Florida
Law Enforcement and Private Security Council that shares information on
retail theft, to the one thousand-member New York Area Police/Private Se-
curity Liaison that has established a business crime squad in midtown Man-
hattan. 114 Membership on the private end of these alliances is sometimes
comprised of contract security companies and corporate police departments;
in others, they are private corporations themselves (that contract with pri-
vate police agencies or employ their own)." 5 The distinctions among these
groups matter less than their shared objective of promoting relationships be-
tween private and public police."
16
Within the range of partnerships, we can identify three general types.
First, for some public police departments, the increased acceptability of
partnerships has led to their greater willingness to enter into joint investiga-
tions with private police, both by lending public personnel, as well as by
providing administrative and technical resources. 17 Second, some partner-
ships provide a formal means to share information on crime patterns and
suspects. 118  Third, in special tax assessment districts (sometimes also
113 See INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OPERATION COOPERATION:
GUIDELINES 1, 3 (2000).
"14 See id. at 7, 9; see also S. Woodruff Bentley, An Alliance is Born, 41 SECURITY
MGMT. 77 (Oct. 1997) (describing Virginia Police and Private Security Alliance); Voelker,
supra note 100, at 1-4 (describing operation of APPL program). For a review of similar
partnerships in Canada, see RIGAKOS, supra note 18, at 42.
115 The Business/Law Enforcement Alliance in California, established in 1994, is one
such example. Its membership consists of private corporations and city, county, state, and
federal law enforcement agencies. See David R. Green, Joining Forces Against Crime, 42
SEC. MGT. 95, 96 (May 1998).
116 Thus, the OPERATION COOPERATION report lists among its examples both kinds of
partnerships referred to here. See INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 113, at 2, 4.
117 Gary Marx discusses one such example: a sting conducted by the FBI and IBM that
targeted the theft of technological trade secrets. See Gary Marx, The Interweaving of Public
and Private Police in Undercover Work, in PRIVATE POLICING, supra note 69, at 172-73.
118 See Voelker, supra note 100, at 2-3 (describing these activities with respect to the
APPL partnership); Richard C. Dujardin, City Police Team Up with Private Security Per-
sonnel, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 9, 2003, at C6 (reporting Providence police chief as saying that
"the most powerful element in [its] new partnership" as "the sharing of information between
private and public agencies"); Christopher Lee, Police Ask Security Guards for Aid in Crime
Crackdown, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 6, 1997, at 25 (quoting Dallas Police Chief as
describing its public-private partnership as "really about information exchange"); see also
Mangan & Shanahan, supra note 112, at 21:
[C]ooperation between public law enforcement and private security must continue and, if there is
one area where public law enforcement and private security have worked cooperatively for joint
advantage, it has been in the area of collection and dissemination of records. The ability of both
public law enforcement and private security to amass large amounts of personal data about peo-
2004]
ELIZABETH E. JOH
known as business improvement districts), groups of private property own-
ers in physical proximity to one another (and typically in urban commercial
areas)119 agree to tax themselves, in excess of their normal obligations, to
pay for additional collective services such as private police and sanitation
workers. 1
20
Despite the fact that public agencies are involved in these alliances,
there is no public regulation over the partnerships themselves. Nor are
there any requirements that these partnerships measure the impact or suc-
cess of their joint ventures. As a result, it will be nearly impossible, absent
voluntary disclosure, to evaluate these emerging organizations.
Those private agencies that enter into joint investigations, participate
in information-sharing networks, or establish special assessment districts
are not the only private police to have benefited from partnerships. A more
subtle effect of public support has been the increased legitimacy of private
policing, and a greater willingness by public police to cooperate with them,
whether or not they are engaged in formal partnerships. The International
Association of Chiefs of Police and the American Society for Industrial Se-
curity (both professional organizations) together lobby for and draft pro-
posed legislation on topics that promote the interests of both groups, such as
increased private police access to criminal records.12' Some public police
academies now educate new recruits on the private police. 122 Advocates of
partnerships attempt to characterize antagonism shown by the public police
as obsolescence. They see obstacles to partnership--"turf battles, misun-
pie's personal histories, employment records, etc., poses serious liability problems during an era
that has seen severe restrictions placed on the use and release of such data.
Id.
119 Not all specially taxed districts include primarily commercial property owners. See,
e.g., JAMES F. PASTOR, THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLICE IN AMERICA 101-63 (2003) (conduct-
ing empirical study of Marquette Park Special Services Area, a special tax assessment dis-
trict for a residential neighborhood in Chicago).
120 See Mark S. Davies, Business Improvement Districts, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 187, 192 (1997) (counting 134 BIDs in New York City); Joseph Mokwa &
Terrence W. Stoehner, Private Security Arches over St. Louis, 39 SEC. MGT. 94 (1995) (de-
scribing operation of St. Louis BID); Marla Dickerson, Suit Challenges Private Security
Controls, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1999, at C1 (counting 1,200 BIDs in North America and be-
tween 150 to 200 in California alone).
121 See R. Moulton, Should Private Security Have Access to Criminal Conviction Files?,
54 THE POLICE CHIEF 35 (1987).
122 See Norman R. Botton, Jr. & Kenneth R. McCreedy, Private Security Lectures as
Part of Southeast Florida's Police Recruit Training, 53 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 17
(1984).
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derstood motives.., and skepticism about the quality of security personnel
and their training"--as relics of the past.
123
The proposal of a Congressional bill in 1996 shows how popular the
idea of partnership has become. Introduced by Representative Bill
McCollum (1981-2001), the Law Enforcement and Industrial Security Co-
operation Act of 1996 would have established a twelve-person commission
composed of members of Congress, as well as representatives from the pri-
vate and public police. 124 Its mission would be to "encourage public agen-
cies and private business and institutions to make use of effective models
for cooperation in crime control and law enforcement," by studying existing
partnerships, and by analyzing laws that "either enhance or inhibit coopera-
tion." 125 The bill's proposed Congressional findings stated that 1) "seventy
percent of all money invested in crime prevention and law enforcement
each year in the United States is spent by the private sector"; 2) there were
three private sector security employees for every one public police officer;
and 3) that "more than half of the responses to crime come from private se-
curity.' ' 126 While the bill was ultimately defeated in committee, its serious
consideration reveals a social and political climate where such partnerships
are becoming increasingly acceptable.
1 27
B. THE CASE STUDY
A case study can add context and detail to the broad overview that I
have provided above. This section discusses an extended example drawn
from an empirical investigation of "T Company," a private police depart-
ment in a large Eastern city. Why choose T Company over possible sites as
a case study? One reason is practical: private police organizations are no-
toriously difficult to study, and T Company allowed me entry into their or-
ganization. 128
123 Bentley, supra note 114, at 77; see also Mangan & Shanahan, supra note 112, at 113
("Ironically, the emergence of the private security industry that now numerically and finan-
cially far exceeds its public counterpart occurred without much influence from or interaction
with public police. In fact, until recently, there was a mixture of disdain and concern that the
emergence of private security was threatening the professionalism of policing.").
124 See Law Enforcement and Industrial Security Cooperation Act of 1996, H.R. 2996,
104th Cong. § 4 (1996).
125 See id. § 3.
126 See id. § 2.
127 For a summary of the bill's history, see http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d104:h.r.02996: (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
128 See infra Appendix.
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In addition, while the case study is not necessarily representative of all
private policing organizations, it nevertheless provides us with an opportu-
nity to evaluate some broad assumptions often made about private police.
Consider again the views of Florida state court Judge Harris in Sipkema v.
Reedy Creek Improvement District:129 do private police merely perform
"night watchmen" duties? 130 That is, are they only guarding against unlaw-
ful incursions onto private property? Alternatively, in view of the emerging
conventional wisdom on the proper relationship between private and public,
how well does a partnership model fit a private police department's rela-
tionship with the local public police?
Where an overview provides breadth, a case study can provide a depth
of detail. The evidence from my study of T Company,13 1 discussed below,
casts doubt on the accuracy of both of the assumptions described above, and
helps further refine our understanding of private policing. This section first
describes the setting in which the study took place, then recounts certain as-
pects of the police work conducted there.
1. Its Setting
T Company is located in a large city in the Northeast United States. It
is a property management company responsible for providing sanitation,
maintenance, and policing services within six city blocks. 32 Within these
129 697 So.2d 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see supra Introduction.
130 Id. at 881. Disney provides an apt example of employers with multiple policing
needs. Disney private police must contend with both the mundane, including the counterfeit
bills passed in United States v. Francoeur, 547 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1977), and the ex-
traordinary, like its potential as a target of terrorism after September 11, 2001. Indeed, the
Federal Aviation Administration granted no-fly zones to both Disneyland and Disney World
on the eve of the nation's war with Iraq. The only other American commercial enterprise
with the same special protection is the Valdez terminal of the Alaska oil pipeline. See Sean
Mussenden & Henry Pierson Curtis, Rules Bent to Give Disney No-Fly Zone, CHI. TRIB.,
May 12, 2003, at 1; see also Sean Mussenden, Disney Erects Bomb Barriers; Steel Barri-
cades Block Service Entrances at Theme Parks, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 15, 2004, at Al
(noting installation of a "'advanced counter-terrorism barrier system"' designed to "stop a
20,000 pound truck bomb traveling 70 mph"); Mike Schneider, Terrorism Hits Theme Parks
in the Wallet, FT. WAYNE J. GAZETTE (Ind.), Oct. 30, 2001, at ID (describing the terrorism-
sensitive security measures newly established at large American theme parks).
131 T Company is a pseudonym for the site studied, and no individuals referred to here
are identified by their real names, according to the conditions of my research access, dis-
cussed further in the Appendix. Unless noted otherwise, all references in the text that follow
regarding T Company and employees are drawn from the observational work and interviews
conducted.
132 These cover approximately eleven acres. The public police district in which the
Department is located employs approximately 300 officers. The community population that
the precinct covers, according to the 2000 census, is 49,984 (information on file with au-
thor).
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six blocks are nineteen high-rise buildings, containing retail businesses, law
firms, investment banks, and restaurants that employ approximately 50,000
people. 133 The property also contains within it an outdoor plaza that func-
tions as a quasi-public space where tourists, shoppers, and employees
gather. (Indeed, Protection Department managers even refer to the property
erroneously as public property.) Thus, the property policed by T Company
resembles both a shopping mall and a corporate campus.
Housed within one of the buildings at the site is a full-time "Protection
Department" employed directly by T company. The Department employs
160 people, of which the majority (between eighty to ninety) are "POs," an
abbreviation for patrol officer. 34 Each officer carries a two-way radio, and
wears a dark blue uniform with shoulder epaulets that identify the Depart-
ment. 135  Their uniforms resemble those of the public police department
133 In 2000, according to the records kept by the Protection Department, there were 650
commercial tenants within the property policed by the Department.
134 If the Protection officers are compared to public officers, this means that the Protec-
tion Department is larger than most of the nation's local police departments. See BRIAN
REAVES & ANDREW GOLDBERG, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS 2000, at 2
tbl.2 (2003). That report defines local departments as those operated by municipal, town-
ship, or county governments. See id. at 1.
135 The Department, like many other private police agencies, creates an impression that
their officers are in some manner related to public agents. See Marx, supra note 117, at 190
n.8. A number of states regulate the appearance of private police uniforms so that they are
not unduly confusing. See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1261 n.536. The misleading appear-
ance of many private police agents, however, suggests that these laws are either under-
enforced or loosely interpreted. For examples of these statutes, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
32-2635 (West 2004) (requiring private uniforms that "will not deceive or confuse the public
or be identical with that of any law enforcement officer"); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
7539(e) (West 2004); (prohibiting private investigators from wearing uniforms "with the in-
tent to give an impression" that they are government agents); id. § 7583.38 (permitting local
governments to regulate uniforms of private patrol officers "to make the uniforms and vehi-
cles clearly distinguishable" from those worn by "regular law enforcement officers"); 225
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 447/25-30 (West 2004) (requiring uniforms do not display the words
"'police,' 'sheriff,' 'highway patrol,' 'trooper,' [or] 'law enforcement'); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 338.1069 (1) (West 2004) (requiring that security uniforms "shall not deceive or con-
fuse the public or be identical with that of a law enforcement officer"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
626.88 (2) (West Supp. 2004) (permitting security uniforms to be "any color other than those
specified by peace officers"); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-27A-12E (Supp. 2004) (prohibiting pri-
vate investigators from wearing uniforms "with the intent to give an impression" that they
are public officials); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4749.08(B) (Anderson 2004) (requiring uni-
forms to appear "so ... as to avoid confusion of a private investigator, security guard pro-
vider, or registered employee with any law enforcement officer"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 59,
§ 1750.9(B) (West 2004) (prohibited security uniforms "that would lead a person to believe
that [the guard] is connected in any way" with government); id. 1750.10 (prohibiting display
of words "'police,' 'deputy,' or 'patrolman' on private uniforms); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-
35-127 to -128 (2004) (requiring private police to affix badge over left breast pocket of uni-
form that is distinct in design from that used by any public police agency, and prohibiting
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enough so that, upon a momentary glance, one might mistake them for the
local public police. 136 Like most private guards, 137 the Department officers
are unarmed 138 and do not possess any special legal powers beyond their
ability as private citizens to arrest or detain persons for crimes, and their
status as agents of the property owners.1 39 The officers work in three shifts
over a twenty-four hour period and are responsible for policing the outside
spaces and interior lobbies of the buildings.140
What follows are the results of my observation of the Department dur-
ing two periods, one in 1998, and the other in 2000. I also conducted open-
ended interviews of its management staff, which is comprised of one direc-
tor, two managers, and four supervisors. Finally, I interviewed the public
police officer who served as the liaison for the city's public-private partner-
ship, and attended three of the partnership's monthly meetings to supple-
ment my understanding.
2. Beyond the Defense of Property
A considerable portion of private policing, as Shearing has pointed
out, involves the protection of private property. 141 Central to the private
any badge that "tends to indicate that such person is a sworn peace officer" or "includes the
word 'police'); VA. CODE ANN. § 52-9.2 (Michie 2004) (prohibiting private uniforms iden-
tical to any official public uniform or "so similar in appearance as to be likely to deceive the
casual observer").
136 See also Scott & McPherson, supra note 65, at 272 ("Public misunderstanding of the
law [as to the authority of private police officers] undoubtedly gives private agents an addi-
tional advantage.").
137 See, e.g., HALLCREST REPORT, supra note 22, at 144 (projecting that by 2000, not
more than five percent of private police personnel would be armed).
138 Only one supervisor, who had retired after twenty years with the city police, carried a
gun in a shoulder holster. Supervisors do not wear uniforms.
139 State law requires that all the Department's officers, who are classified as security
guards, receive the following training: eight hours of "pre-assignment training"; a minimum
of sixteen hours of "on-the-job" training, and an eight hour annual in-service training course.
According to the state's administrative code, the eight hours of pre-assignment training must
at a minimum include 1) introduction (.25 hour); 2) role of a security guard (1.25 hours); 3)
legal powers and limitations (2 hours); 4) emergency situations (1 hour); 5) communications
and public relations (1 hour); 6) access control (.5 hour); 7) ethics and conduct (1 hour); and
8) review and examination (1 hour) (on file with author).
140 In 2000, officers starting employment with the Department earned $11.98 per hour,
and with seniority could earn $16.43 per hour. In comparative terms, Department officers
earn a higher wage than the national median salary for a security guard, which was $17,570
in 2000, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 350-52 (2002-03), available at http://www.bls.gov/
oco/pdf/ocos 159.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
141 See, e.g., Shearing, supra note 64, at 526-29.
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property right is the ability to exclude, which the Supreme Court has de-
scribed as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property."'' 42 The role of private police in pro-
tecting property is often characterized as a passive one. The popular refer-
ence to security guards (rather than to "officers" or "investigators") gives
the impression that private police are mainly engaged in passive action.
43
Likewise, the employees of the Protection Department are quick to mini-
mize their own duties and powers. 44 Therefore, it would be reasonable to
assume that the policing of private property, even property with quasi-
public aspects, is passive and reactionary. The sections that follow, how-
ever, suggest that this portrait is not wholly accurate. The Protection De-




To gain entry into the Protection Department's control center, you
must first find it; its offices are tucked away along a dark hallway in one of
the high-rise buildings on the property. You must then pass through a
locked door monitored by closed circuit television cameras. Located inside
is the Department's "control center." Enclosed within glass walls, the con-
trol center resembles a space launch command center in miniature, with
multiple monitors, computers, and communications equipment. 46  From
here, two Protection officers watch the cameras monitoring the property:
sixteen in the outdoor spaces, and nearly three hundred within the build-
ings. 47 To demonstrate how well they worked, one officer operated a sur-
veillance camera so that he, from several stories up, could read the head-
lines of a newspaper held by a person sitting in the outdoor plaza.
142 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 447 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
143 See also infra Part III.
144 See also Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1183 ("Private security companies eager to appear
unthreatening often stress that their personnel are limited to the search and arrest powers of
ordinary citizens.").
141 Id. at 1168.
146 The analogy is not so far from reality. The company that supplies and services the
Department's surveillance cameras at one time supplied equipment to NASA.
"W As a comparison, Macy's department store in New York City employs about the same
number of surveillance cameras to stop shoplifting. See Andrea Elliott, In Stores, Private
Handcuffs for Sticky Fingers, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at Al (reporting that there are
more than 300 surveillance cameras that are used by Macy's security department). Inciden-




From the control center, the Protection Department relies on what so-
ciologists Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty refer to as "bureaucratic
surveillance": the routine and continuous recording of the frequency, loca-
tion, and timing of people's movements. 48 Such close and constant moni-
toring is possible because the Department has a high "surveillance capac-
ity."' 149 Not only do officers monitor the cameras, they maintain logbooks
for people who enter the buildings at night, collect and monitor work au-
thorizations for hundreds of service employees who enter the property, and
maintain electronic records on all employees who use computer identifica-
tion cards to enter into the buildings.
The constant, systematic, and routinized collection of information
means that some kinds of investigations are much easier for the private po-
lice than they would be for the public police. Consider the difficulties the
public police would encounter in trying to determine a person's where-
abouts on a particular day and in a specific location. Witnesses must be
questioned, routines disrupted, and a trail leading back in space and time
must be reconstructed. Within their own jurisdiction, by contrast, private
police have a much easier time with such matters, for they may ask, as a
condition of access, for all kinds of personal information, and implicitly re-
ceive consent to monitor personal movement.
The Department provided many examples of this capability. In one
case, a business tenant asked the Department to review its electronic card
access records on a particular night to see if one its employees had been
within the building over the weekend when he was unauthorized to be there.
(He had been.) Another tenant asked the Department to install hidden sur-
veillance cameras within its premises, a restaurant, to help apprehend the
person who had been stealing customers' wallets and purses. The public
police also take advantage of the Department's surveillance capacity. Dur-
ing the period from Thanksgiving to Christmas, city police detectives look-
ing for pickpockets watch the Department's surveillance cameras. Opening
their doors to the city police is, according to a Department manager, "good
for the quality of life of the city."
148 See ERICSON & HAGGERTY, supra note 43, at 95 (defining bureaucratic surveillance as
"the production and distribution of knowledge useful for risk management and administra-
tion"). Oscar Gandy describes eleven sources of such routinely collected information: per-
sonal credentials (driver's license); financial activity (ATM cards); insurance (health policy);
social service (pension plans); utility service (telephone); real estate (sale); entertainment
(travel documents); consumer activity (credit accounts); employment (applications); educa-
tion (references); and legal (court files). See OSCAR H. GANOY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 63 (1993).
149 See ERICSON & HAGGERTY, supra note 43, at 95 (defining surveillance capacity as the
"ability to establish and sustain surveillance mechanisms").
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b. Compliance-Based Policing
If one were to assess the police work at the Protection Department by
arrest activity, there would be virtually nothing to study. I observed no ar-
rests during the period of my observation, and conversations with Protec-
tion officers and managers revealed none in recent memory. 50 It would be
wrong, however, to conclude that these private police fail to engage in
"real" police work because they lack the indicia of productivity associated
with the public police: arrest and clearance rates.15' Rather, the absence of
arrest provides an opportunity to compare the distinctive models of policing
used by private and public police to control crime and disorder. Sociologist
Albert Reiss would call them compliance and deterrence-based policing.
While both compliance and deterrence models seek law-abiding be-
havior, they differ in the means by which to achieve that result. Reiss dis-
tinguishes them in this manner:
Compliance systems aim to prevent violations of the law from happening or to reduce
their harmful consequences. Deterrence systems must allow violations of the law to
occur so that those violations can be punished to produce the deterrent effect. The
cost of deterrence is always some violation of the law. 
152
Because no model of policing adopts one form wholly to the exclusion
of the other, compliance and deterrence models are best understood as ideal
types. Nevertheless, these are useful distinctions because police organiza-
tions tend to prefer one model over another. As a consequence of historical
change and because of the structure of the present criminal justice system,
public police organizations rely principally (although not entirely) on a de-
terrence-based model. As public police departments emerged from the con-
150 The Department did not appear to keep any record of arrests. To some degree, the
compilation and organization of information within private police organizations varies to the
degree that this is required by law (not the case here), or to the extent to which the organiza-
tion must use that information to promote its services (also not the case here). Compare
RIGAKOS, supra note 18, at 35 ("To sell parapolicing [his term for private police], Intelli-
garde must provide both public and private clients with evidence of a tangible security prod-
uct.").
151 The symbolic importance of arrests, however, should not be mistaken for the actual
frequency of arrests conducted by public police officers. As many public police researchers
have observed, the average patrol officer conducts very few arrests. In his study of a Cana-
dian public police department, Richard Ericson vividly described the realities of a patrol of-
ficer's typical day: "[T]he bulk of the patrol officer's time was spent doing nothing other
than consuming the petrochemical energy required to run an automobile and the psychic en-
ergy required to deal with the boredom of it all." ERICsON, supra note 44, at 206; see also
DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 22-23 (1994) (describing a typical evening shift
for a public patrol officer).
152 Albert Reiss, Consequences of Compliance and Deterrence Models of Law Enforce-
mentfor the Exercise of Police Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 94 (1984).
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stable-watch system of the nineteenth century, they separated themselves
from the inspectorate system, which operated on a compliance model.153 In
addition, the modem public police organization operates on the formal pre-
sumption that it exists to obtain arrests so that other actors in the criminal
justice system can thereby control crime by punishing offenders.1
5 4
Private police organizations, by contrast, have no such direct relation-
ship with the criminal justice system, and, as discussed earlier, may refer to
an entirely different, and private, system of norm enforcement and sanc-
tions.155 Their methods of policing, therefore, can be quite distinct from
those employed by the public police. Arrest, then, is a misleading basis of
comparison. In our example, the Protection Department engages in a com-
pliance model of policing, 56 or more specifically, in Reiss's terms, an in-
centive-based compliance model. 57 How the Protection Department han-
dles crowds provides an illustration.
One July evening, the Department prepared for a concert of a popular
singer to be staged in the outdoor plaza the next morning. By sunset, a
large group (perhaps some seventy-five people) were milling about the
plaza with the clear intention of staying there throughout the night. In the
Department's "war room," the Director had tacked up a map of the plaza
charting out policing arrangements. He instructed the Department officers
to set up a "bull pen," metal crowd barricades (borrowed from the city po-
lice), arranged so as to control and limit the movement of the crowd.
Throughout the night, the Protection officers, by polite instruction (and with
the implicit threat of expulsion for non-compliance) moved the amorphous
crowd into straight lines, and corralled them behind metal barricades, all
without incident.
153 Id at 83.
154 Id. at 105. Although he emphasizes the dominance of a deterrence model within pub-
lic police organizations, Reiss is also quick to point out that individual patrol officers some-
times rely upon a threat-based compliance model, particularly in dealing with "soft" or less
serious crimes. Id. at 107. These compliance strategies, however, are rarely recognized
formally by public police managers or legislators. Id. at 112.
155 See supra Part I.C.
156 Reiss himself identified the use of a compliance model by private police. Reiss, su-
pra note 152, at 99. Of the private police, he observes briefly: "Their [the public police]
competitors in private policing, however, are compliance- and discipline-centered, a factor
that may figure in the latter's substantial growth and explain how their work accomplishes
the ends of the private organizations which employ them. Private organizations ordinarily
seek compliance, not deterrence." Id.
157 Reiss distinguishes between two kinds of compliance: "Compliance is voluntary in
incentive-based systems whereas it is to some degree coerced in threat-based systems." Id
at 91.
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The war room plans showed that the Department, as it often does, had
also hired off-duty city police. In 1998, the city police established an offi-
cial program formally permitting its officers to accept private employment,
in uniform, with private companies located in the city. To administer the
program, the city police established a new internal department that proc-
esses paperwork for off-duty work, screens prospective employers, and
maintains a list of volunteer officers who seek private employment. For the
large crowd anticipated for the concert, the Department had hired eleven
city officers: two to work from midnight to 6 a.m., and the other nine offi-
cers to be present from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m.
By the next morning, the crowd from the previous night had doubled.
Within the space of a few hundred square feet, the police presence was for-
midable: a phalanx of public officers (some privately paid and some offi-
cers voluntarily stopping by to "help out"), several protection officers on
duty, and plainclothes Department supervisors. Control center operators
monitored the surveillance cameras and communicated any suspicious ac-
tivity to the officers on the ground. To judge by the enthusiasm of the
crowd, few perceived the police presence as threatening. And, like the eve-
ning before, all of the police working for the Department continued to in-
struct individuals in the crowd to move in one direction or another. The
event, which took place within a busy section of the city at morning rush
hour, ended with no arrests, nor any incidents of unruliness or recalcitrance
among the crowd.
The Protection Department did not resort to arrests because no such
powers were necessary. Its compliance-based policing relies on "manipu-
lat[ing] means that induce conformity."' 58 The willingness of the crowd to
submit to instruction and obey private police commands turns on the De-
partment's ability to deny access to a desired resource: here, the concert.
The use of bureaucratic surveillance eases this task by permitting identifica-
tion of the slightest opportunities for disorder or crime, and also the means
to address these opportunities by enforcing compliance. Likewise, in their
description of private policing at Disney World, Shearing and Stenning
noted that in the Magic Kingdom, "[o]pportunities for disorder are mini-
mized by constant instruction, by physical barriers which severely limit the
choice of action available and any by the surveillance of omnipresent em-
ployees who detect and rectify the slightest deviation."' 59 What might ap-
pear, then, to be inaction on the part of the private police is revealed, upon
158 Reiss, supra note 85, at 25.
159 Shearing & Stenning, supra note 69, at 319.
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closer examination, as more subtle, "apparently non-coercive and consen-
sual" methods. 
160
The presence of off-duty police illustrates another point: when compli-
ance-based policing fails, the employment of public police in uniform per-
mits the Department to turn to more coercive methods. 61 For instance, the
Department prefers that the off-duty city police they hire address exclu-
sively what it perceives as the "peddler problem": young men who skirt the
boundaries of the plaza private property with stashes of counterfeit watches,
handbags, and sunglasses, all wrapped in cloth bundles or garbage bags car-
ried over their shoulders.1 62 (The city's administrative code prohibits street
vendors from selling their wares, unless approved by a city review panel, in
the physical space near where the plaza is located.) 63 The Department
management is not especially interested in stamping out illegal conduct;
rather, as one manager explained, peddlers are "an eyesore." Peddlers are
the main reason, according to Protection managers, why the Department
hires off-duty police, because peddlers, a decidedly marginalized group, re-
spond less compliantly to the demands of its own officers than to a city of-
ficer in public uniform. Actual arrests of these peddlers are rare. What
matters is that the threat of arrest and public prosecution embodied in the
city police uniform convinces peddlers to move away from the property.
Because the Department is interested in street peddling not as an ille-
gal activity but as a unsightly one (detracting from the Center's image as a
clean, orderly, and safe destination), the off-duty city police hired by the
Department simply disperse peddlers they find. The peddlers who solicit
the business of tourists, shoppers, and office workers walking through the
outdoor plaza display their goods while nervously surveying their surround-
ings. When an off-duty cop sees and approaches a peddler, he gathers up
his belongings and walks off the plaza grounds.
The unquestioning compliance with public police authority is useful on
many occasions. On another evening, control center operators noticed from
their surveillance monitors a crowd gathering around a street performer
standing on the (private) plaza. A supervisor approached that day's off-
duty cop, who, at the end of his shift, was waiting in the control center to
160 Id. at 322.
161 For a similar observation, see id. at 320-21.
162 For a description of the attempts by public police to control the counterfeiting trade,
see Scott Malone, Counterfeiting and Terrorism, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Sept. 15, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 61796464.
163 For an insightful discussion of how a group of New York City street vendors work
and live within a similar system of regulation, see generally MITCHELL DUNEIER, SIDEWALK
(1999).
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complete his paperwork. Would the officer mind taking care of something,
and would he be leaving the plaza in uniform? The supervisor pointed out
the performer, visible on the monitors, to the officer, who agreed to the
task. On his way home, the uniformed cop asked the performer to leave,
thereby dispersing the crowd.
3. Relations with the Public Police
The Department belongs to the formal, city-wide partnership estab-
lished in 1986 by the public police. Its official purpose is to foster coopera-
tion between the public department and the hundreds of private policing op-
erations in the city. In practice, cooperation is one, but not the only, kind of
relationship the Department maintains with the public police.
a. The Old Boy Network
The term "old boy network," conveys in shorthand form the social ties
among members of a given profession, such as politicians, judges, or as
here, the police.164 Among former public police, these informal connections
provide access to information and privileges that the general public would
find difficult to obtain. Clients of private police know that former public
police may possess "dual allegiances" to their former agency and to their
private employer.' 65 In public professions, these informal ties pose poten-
tial troubling ethical dilemmas, for they suggest that despite the ostensible
principles of equality and openness with which institutions like policing are
conducted, some people may receive more favorable treatment than others.
To take best advantage of such connections, the Protection Department
consistently hires former highly-ranked officers from the city's public po-
lice department. Directors N.K. and S.R., the two people who held the di-
rector's position during the time of my study, 66 bore fifty-five years of col-
lective public police experience between them. 67 Their offices displayed
all of the accoutrements of their former public lives: awards, plaques, and
police helmets. When calling someone with the city police department,
164 For further discussion of the "old boy network" in private policing, see Joh, supra
note 63.
165 See Ralph Blumenthal, Growing Ranks of Private Guards Cooperate in Public Polic-
ing, N.Y. TIMEs, July 13, 1993, at BI (quoting Joseph Rosetti, former U.S. Senate investiga-
tor and currently vice chairman of Kroll Associates).
166 By 2000, N.K. had moved on to manage another private security department within
the city.
167 N.K. had been with the city police for twenty seven years; S.R., twenty-eight. Both
had risen to executive positions within the city police.
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they even introduced themselves by their former titles, e.g., "Hello, it's
Chief [R]."
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, I observed no specific examples of informal
information exchanges between the Department and the city police, and no
member of management spoke openly of any.' 68 Yet, a number of patrol
officers there point out that it was no coincidence that the Department al-
ways employed a former city police officer in the Director's position (as
opposed to a private citizen or public officer from another jurisdiction).
According to one of the Department directors, relations with the local pre-
cinct are friendly:
The PD works very closely with us. The fact that there is a police officer who works
strictly [for this center], during the week, [and] in addition whenever we have any
special events here. The PD's very cooperative in sending us help, which is either
through police officers or sending us barricades, but it's [a] very good rapport we
have with them, whereby all it warrants is a phone call that either [the director] makes
or myself makes or [another manager] makes, and once a call is made, you can actu-
ally say what's going to be done. Whenever they respond here, they respond in a very
appropriate manner and I've never any had any problems with them.
It is probably impossible to gauge with real accuracy how much or how of-
ten any private department relies on informal connections to public police
officials. 169 At the very least, the Department's hiring of former high rank-
ing public officials facilitates those connections if desired.
b. The Uses of Partnership
The Department is also a formal member of the city's public-private
partnership. The partnership is administered by its citywide coordinator,
D.E., who is a city police officer, and his administrative assistant. Working
from the police department's headquarters, the liaison organizes monthly
meetings for the partnership's members, who include the private police di-
rectors for department stores, banks, corporations, and contract guard com-
panies.
Formal meetings, which are usually hosted by a private police director
at his or her workplace, provide a venue both for socialization among the
members (of which there were 1,200 city-wide in 2000), and for the distri-
bution of news and alerts by the public police liaison. In the coordinator's
168 Jones and Newbum encountered similar results. See JONES & NEWBURN, supra note
26, at 174 ("Informal discussions with security personnel suggested that [information ex-
change in the old boy network] almost certainly goes on, though we discovered little about
the circumstances or extent.").
169 Cf PRIVATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 84, at 14 (commenting that
"'sub rosa' channels of communication" will probably always exist).
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view, the public police motivation for promoting and participating in the
partnership is simple:
We double our eyes and ears by giving them information. It's almost unbelievable
how many [private] officers are in the street, and some of them, they have security in
the buildings in [the city]. A lot of larcenies and theft are in buildings, you know, lap-
tops and stuff. If we can let them know, this is what someone looks like, he just hit
four buildings in your area. The security people will be on top of it, tell their people,
stop someone from leaving, because that's the guy. There's been times [when]
they've caught people that we've been looking for, because they knew that something
was going on. And of course that's nothing more than sitting down, having a cup of
coffee, making friends and having a meeting. That's the main gist of what we do.
After repeated complaints by partnership members about theft within build-
ings, for example, the city police also provided training to private police di-
rectors in fingerprint collection techniques:
Before if someone took a laptop or two, we'd take a report and that's kind of it. If
there's [sic] witnesses, the [public] detectives would follow up with an investigation,
but more often than not, no one saw what happened, and there's just a report. What
we decided to do was train certain private security directors to lift for fingerprints at
the crime scene in their building, and only on a larceny, not on a violent case.., so
why not have the director of security who might be past law enforcement or has been
in private security long enough that it's enough for us to look at them as law enforce-
ment.
Let's train that guy to go into the cubicle where it was stolen, in a fifty story building,
rather than cops following the basic lead. He takes his print kit out, dusts the area,
and it could be an employee that did it or maybe he knows someone could be a tenant,
a messenger. He gets a print, he gives it to us, and we can run it in our fingerprint
system, and say hey that guy, maybe he's done a bunch of larcenies, he has no right to
be there in that building, and his fingerprint puts him right in that building. We can
question that person, maybe get a confession. And a lot of times they get confession,
because there's a lot of employee theft.
Apart from property theft, terrorism is another source of concern for
private police departments in the city, and the liaison spoke, although in a
roundabout way, of alerting the partnership members about threats:
If we send a message out to them, a definitive incident could happen in [the city],
we're raising our security, you should do the same, they can kind of read between the
lines that there's talk of maybe things could happen here .... Sometimes the intelli-
gence division gets information that there's potential for things to happen, nothing
specific, we'll let them know that.
c. Passive Non-Cooperation
To say that the Protection Department relies on its informal connec-
tions to the public police is to present only a partial truth, for the private po-
lice also sometimes engage in what I'll call passive non-cooperation. That
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is, while I found no evidence that these private police deliberately conceal
information requested from the police, in certain respects they choose not to
reveal information that the public police might find relevant to their own
work.
N.K., one of the directors (and a former high-ranking city police offi-
cer), explained that on some occasions not only did the Department choose
not to call the public police, it would not welcome their presence. "They
create chaos," he explained:
We want to get there before the cops do. Why? Because if there is an attachd case on
the street, they'll want to shut everything down. But was there a phone call? Was
there a letter? What are the chances that it really is a bomb? The cops don't care.
They figure 'you never know.' We don't want to just shut down for that. We want to
protect ourselves from the police, to tell you the truth.
To this end, the Department employs its own bomb squad-two trained
dogs and their handler-and had occasion to use them when suspicious
packages were reported by tenants.
D.E., the city liaison, also noted that decisions by private police not to
inform the public police of criminal activity were worrisome. Regarding
employee theft, D.E. observed, "our problem is that a lot of times they'll
terminate [the offender] rather than arrest. We don't like that." When
asked why, he responded,
It's their decision to prosecute or not. And the security director might want to, but a
lot of times there's concern there could be [negative publicity], instead of arresting
him [the employer decides], just get rid of him. We prefer to get an arrest because all
[the offender is] going to do is get in trouble somewhere else, and that's a problem.
These comments suggest that private police neither work under the direc-
tion of the public police, nor cooperate fully even when the public police
would wish them to.170 Instead, private police managers cooperate with the
public police when doing so serves their interests or, more specifically, their
clients' interests. Thus, passive non-cooperation is also an important aspect
of the relationship between the two groups. 1
71
170 The remarks also suggests that private police organizations, concentrating upon a sin-
gle site within a city or county, are less concerned with the possible displacement effects of
their actions than public police organizations may be. See infra Appendix.
171 Cf Cooperating with Law Enforcement: Do You Have More to Gain Than Fear?,
SEC. DIRECTOR'S REPORT, Feb. 2004, at 4 ("You may still choose to keep some security
cases to yourself, but a stronger bond between your company and law enforcement is now a
net gain, in SDR's view.").
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4. Summary and Implications
Referring to the case study, we can correct some common misunder-
standings about the private police. First, to say that private police only pro-
tect property is to underestimate considerably the extent to which they in-
vestigate, observe, and actively manage the behavior and movement of
others.' 72 Furthermore, private and public police cannot be said to operate
in wholly separate spheres. Professional, social, and structural ties result in
the interpenetration of both groups. Public and private police are also
drawn to one another to the extent that they provide "functional alterna-
tives" to one another. 1
73
As we will see in the next Part, the legal rules governing the private
and public police assume that there exist two wholly separate realms of po-
licing separated by differences of jurisdiction, function, and expectations.
As an illustration, the Protection Department's policing suggests why the
boundary between private and public is more permeable and fluid than the
distinction in law implies.
Most evident from the T Company example is the observation that
public policing is deeply intertwined in private policing work. At T com-
pany, we can see the interlacement of public and private in several ways.
First, the movement of personnel between the city police department and T
company's management reinforces close organizational and personal ties
between private and public. Former city police employed at T Company
continue to see themselves as connected to the public police department,
even though they are no longer formally associated with it.
Second, the regular employment of otherwise full-time public police,
in public uniform, means that T company, as a private corporation, may
make use of the public status, symbols, and authority of the public police
for its own ends. Private police managers are frank about why they employ
off-duty police: those persons who are least desired (e.g., street peddlers) on
their private property are more inclined to listen to a public officer in uni-
form, regardless of who pays for the service.
172 Similarly, Thomas Scott and Marlys McPherson, in their study of private police in
Minnesota, came to this conclusion:
What appears to legally distinguish the private police from the public police is the purpose for
which private agents are licensed and the method of compensation. The private police agent per-
forms functions which are virtually identical in many respects to those carried out by public po-
lice but he performs them for other private individuals and is paid for his services a sum agreed
upon by both parties without statutory limitations as to the amount.
Scott & McPherson, supra note 65, at 273-74.
173 See Marx, supra note 117, at 182. This is discussed further infra Part III.
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Third, the close contacts between T company and the city police mean
that private policing at the Center is "effectively underwritten" by the pub-
lic police. 174 It is the mandate of the public police to respond to citizen
complaints, of course, but private police call on their public colleagues not
out of helplessness, powerlessness, or an inability to find an effective reso-
lution. 175 Rather, the private police seek public aid to reinforce judgments
and resolutions they have already identified, such as ejecting a homeless
person or dispersing an unruly crowd, and desire more coercive aid than
that which is available to them, or that they wish to employ themselves.
At a more basic level, the T Company evidence suggests that however
they describe themselves ("doing nothing" or "customer service"), private
police engage in an active and interventionist enterprise in which they as-
sume policing responsibility within their physical jurisdiction that is, in the
main, no less "policing" than what most public police do. Through unre-
mitting surveillance, constant instruction, employment of the public police,
and membership in a partnership, T company does much of what a typical
police department does: maintaining order and controlling crime. While
the public police officer's heightened legal powers should not be mini-
mized, the absence of arrests by T company police should not be interpreted
as evidence of their relative disempowerment.
In this respect, both the insights of Shearing and Reiss warrant repeat-
ing. Private police do not resort to the more coercive methods associated
with the public police because they cannot, but because they need not. Pri-
vate police have at their disposal the means to deny access to those who are
most easily persuaded to comply. Mall shoppers, airport travelers, and pri-
vate employees all represent classes of persons amenable to the subtle con-
trols imposed by private police that appear de minimis to the casual ob-
server because they do not usually involve detentions, searches, or other
forms of coercive control. As for other groups less likely to submit to their
instruction (juveniles, the homeless, and other marginalized groups), the
private police can resort to their close relationships to the public police.
(At the same time, it must be remembered that some private police do,
unlike the Protection Department, engage in activity that might appear more
174 JoNEs & NEWBURN, supra note 26, at 181 (noting that private police have a "safety-
net" in the public police).
175 Cf BAYLEY, supra note 42, at 20 (observing that the public police confront "the be-
grimed reality of the lives of people who have no one else to take their problems to").
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conventionally "police-like": seizing evidence, 176 conducting pat-downs for
weapons,177 questioning suspected persons,178 and effectuating arrests. 179 )
Furthermore, the evidence from the Protection Department provides an
opportunity to examine two of the assumptions underlying the new conven-
tional wisdom of partnership. First, supporters assert that partnerships
serve objectives shared by public and private police. 80 Second, advocates
of partnership trumpet the benefits that accrue to "the public" or to "the
community" as a result of close private-public relationships.' 81
While private and public police may share some objectives, this broad
statement certainly needs qualification. The Protection Department police
focus on those sources of crime and disorder that affect the value of the
property they police. This includes a considerable number of issues, such
as petty theft, vandalism, and crowd control, but not others. This means
that the Department, like other private police agencies, will tolerate some
kinds and degree of disorder if reacting to them is overly costly or disrup-
tive to a client's concerns. 182 In addition, the Protection Department man-
agers display some passive non-cooperation toward the public police. Pri-
vate police cooperate to the extent that partnership suits their own needs,
176 See, e.g., Sizemore v. State, 483 N.E.2d 56, 57 (Ind. 1985) (describing surveillance
and seizure of stolen credit cards by Kmart security guards).
177 See, e.g., Cullom v. State, 673 P.2d 904, 904 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) ("The guard
took Cullom to the store's security office, recovered the [stolen] cologne set, read Cullom his
Miranda rights, and then frisked Cullom for weapons. The weapons search is apparently a
routine procedure."). While the guard read Cullom his Miranda rights, he was not vested
with public police powers. Id. at 904-05; see also People v. Holloway, 267 N.W.2d 454, 455
(Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (describing pat-down conducted by drugstore security guard leading
to weapons charges).
178 See, e.g., United States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 442 (8th Cir. 1994) (describing writ-
ten confession obtained after thirty minute private interrogation of bank employee by bank
security officer).
179 See, e.g., People v. Moreno, 135 Cal. Rept. 340, 341 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1976) (noting that security guard had arrested approximately three dozen people in eighteen
months).
180 See, e.g., Pending Crime Bills: Hearing on H.R. 2641, H.R. 2803, and H.R. 2996 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996),
available at 1996 WL 134391 (stating that with regard to a proposed bill on partnerships,
"[p]ublic law enforcement and the private security industry work toward the same goals").
181 See, e.g., INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 113, at 3 ("Community polic-
ing, with its call to establish partnerships, requires cooperative efforts (including partner-
ships with 'corporate citizens'), and private security is a natural partner.").
182 Cf Shearing, supra note 64, at 534 ("The inevitable result of... instrumental polic-
ing is... that a certain amount of suspected deviance will often be tolerated because the




including methods of "cooperation" that may thwart public police objec-
tives.
Incidentally, the absence of complete conformity between private and
public police goals also suggests that the apparent trend of ever-increasing
numbers of police are unlikely to result in a "Big Brother" society, to the
extent that Orwell's literary metaphor implies an overarching police struc-
ture with central coordination.183 There are, as the Protection Department
evidence suggests, areas of overlapping concern, but the public police do
not direct the private police in any true sense.
As for the second assumption, while the Department polices a popula-
tion, consisting of shoppers, employees, tourists, and other visiting urban
residents, it can hardly be described as a "community," if by that term we
mean a group of persons to whom the Department renders account. Simply
put, the Department is only interested in the directions, approval, and guid-
ance of its employer, T company. To the extent that there exists feedback
by the population policed, it would consist of decreased popularity of the
plaza as a place to visit, or the decreased desirability of the office buildings
as spaces in which to do business. But this kind of indirect communication
is not analogous to the structure, however flawed, of public criticism, re-
sponse, and accountability associated with the public police departments.
Thus, "community," as it is used in the partnership context, is an ambigu-
ous, and perhaps a misleading, concept.
For all these reasons, the partnership model, in which the Protection
Department takes part, threatens to distort basic values associated with pub-
lic policing, specifically, and the criminal justice system, generally. In con-
ventional legal scholarship, the shibboleths of public interest, equal treat-
ment, and justice are used with such frequency they have become
hackneyed phrases. The rise of private policing, however, provides a fresh
perspective on these ideas, and suggests that ideas like "community" or
"public interest" have meanings that are increasingly contestable.
III. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DIVERGENCE: LAW
I would like to invoke the folk wisdom that if an object looks like a duck, walks like a
duck and quacks like a duck, it is likely to be a duck. If a security officer in an estab-
lishment open to the public dresses like a peace officer, carries a gun and a simulated
badge or shoulder emblem like a peace officer, and conducts himself in the authorita-
tive manner of a peace officer, he surely will be deemed in the eyes of the public and
detained suspects to be the equivalent of a peace officer.
183 For an insightful discussion of competing privacy models inspired by George Orwell
and Franz Kafka, see generally Daniel Solove, Privacy and Power, Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393 (2001).
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-Justice Mosk, concurring in People v. Deborah C., 1981184
"Private security guards ... fall into a 'gray' area astride the public-private distinc-
tion."
-Judge Kaufman, concurring in People v. Holloway, 1978185
As we have seen, private and public police now engage in substantially
similar activities. Policing, then, is more than what the public police do.
The law that regulates the public police, however, is largely inapplicable to
the private police. An unyielding legal distinction divides the two groups.
By drawing such a contrast between public and private, the law ad-
vances a restrictive definition of the police. While I refer to private police,
courts and legislatures more often than not choose a term like private secu-
rity. Thus, when speaking of the police, we usually mean the public police.
So it should be no surprise that the legal rules concerning police behavior,
conventionally understood, have nothing to do with the private police. In-
deed, to define a law of "private policing" requires the collation of various
statutory and common law rules directed at a motley group of private detec-
tives, guards, "special police," and even ordinary citizens.
This difference is not simply one of vocabulary. By drawing that dis-
tinction, legal decisions (both judicial opinions and statutes) promote nor-
mative and descriptive assumptions about who the "police" are. This ob-
servation is not particular to the police; legal decisions take part in shaping
the interpretation of the empirical world, rather than simply applying rules
to a fixed reality.186 Legal scholars have pointed out, for instance, how our
understanding of gender, race, and the family have been shaped by law.'
87
We may not recognize policing as a similarly contested concept, but that is
not so because the term-its content and interpretation-is any less open to
debate.
184 635 P.2d 446, 455 (Cal. 1981) (Mosk, J., concurring).
185 267 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (Kaufman, J., concurring).
186 Elizabeth Mertz would call this "a 'moderate' social constructionist vision of law," in
which there is "moderate skepticism regarding the fixed or natural character of categories."
Elizabeth Mertz, A New Social Constructionism for Sociolegal Studies, 28 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 1243, 1244-45 (1994). For further discussion of that view and a helpful bibliography
on constructionism and the law, see id.
187 See, e.g., Ariela Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641 (2003) (showing how pre-
sumptions regarding male-dominated households shaped the regulation of widows' benefits
in nineteenth-century America and ideas about the "normal" family). In her review of schol-
arship by Martha Fineman and Linda Gordon, Alice Hearst observes that both show "how a
particular idea of the family has become naturalized in American law and policy, resulting in
a peculiarly narrow conception of the 'good' or 'normal' family." Alice Hearst, Construct-
ing the Family in Law and Policy, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 131, 133 (1997).
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How is it that the law has so far removed private from public policing?
We can attribute this sharp distinction to at least two presumptions in the
law of (public) policing that obscure private police activity from otherwise
applicable rules. Call one the superficiality of state involvement; the other,
the centrality of arrest.
By state involvement, I refer to the legal doctrine of state action, the
fulcrum on which all of the federal constitutional law regulating public po-
lice behavior turns. In order for the judicially interpreted restraints of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution to apply to
police action, there must exist activity attributable to the state, in contrast
to, for example, action by private citizens in which public police involve-
ment is incidental or absent. Judicial determination of whether state action
exists in contested police action is usually superficial. In the vast majority
of the cases regulating the public police, the presence of state action is un-
disputed; the character and extent of (public) police involvement, seemingly
obvious.
The second presumption refers to the role of public police as initiators
of the criminal justice process, by their identification and apprehension of
offenders. While public police work, as I have discussed, involves more
than investigation and arrest, the law places greatest importance on the po-
lice work that leads to a criminal prosecution. 188 Call this focus the central-
ity of arrest. Paying greatest attention to police behavior at the moment of
arrest has troubled scholars of the public police more than the state action
doctrine has. Egon Bittner, for example, observes that the public police
stand in a producer-consumer relationship with the courts.189 Because
courts necessarily depend upon public police to produce cases for their con-
sideration, Bittner suggests, courts are poorly situated to then control police
behavior. 190 In addition, the centrality of arrest leaves largely ignored the
many opportunities for the exercise of authority by police officers that do
not lead to arrest, such as harassment or intimidation.'
91
Against the background of these two observations, this Part examines
the legal regulation of private police conduct. 192 The legal construction of
188 Cf Reiss, supra note 152, at 103 ("The legality of arrest behavior thus has become
central to the processing of cases through that system.").
189 See Bittner, supra note 45, at 113 (observing that "the present arrangement between
prosecutors and judges, on the one hand, and the police, on the other hand, is not unlike that
between any set of independent consumers and suppliers of services").
190 See id. at 112-13.
191 See, e.g., Reiss, supra note 152, at 86-88, and supra notes accompanying Part I.
192 Thus, I do not examine here many other important issues related to private policing,
including the tort liability of those who employ private police who behave illegally; any ob-
ligation of private property owners to provide private police for tenants or visitors; the ability
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policing, carried out through these two presumptions, has important practi-
cal consequences. Analysis of the rules regulating the private police illus-
trates how these presumptions reinforce a formal divide between public and
private. That distinction is at odds with the organizational and social links
between them. Because the law of criminal procedure, the rules constrain-
ing public police conduct, have been heavily "constitutionalized," the dis-
cussion here also pays greatest attention to federal constitutional law, al-
though some consideration is given to other sources of legal control. This
Part begins by reviewing the existing laws governing private police behav-
ior, and then identifies three puzzles governing private police law that arise
out of the divide between the formally distinct legal regimes controlling the
public and private police.
A. THE EXIST1NG FRAMEWORK
Private policing law is a jumble of state regulations and common law
doctrines. 193 There exist hardly any federal statutes directed specifically
toward private police conduct. The most notable exception is the seldom-
invoked federal statute outlawing the employment of Pinkerton police, en-
acted in 1893.194 Most importantly, the Supreme Court and the lower courts
have repeatedly rejected claims that the federal constitutional constraints
placed on public police should also apply to the private police. This section
provides an overview of that legal framework.
of private police to enforce private speech regulations; or various workplace regulations that
apply to private police as an occupational class. For examples of cases in these areas, see
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that state constitutional
rules allowing individuals to enter a shopping mall and gather petitions did not violate the
property owners' First and Fifth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution); Kline v.
1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that a landlord must
take steps to minimize the risk of crime against tenants when he or she has knowledge of the
insufficiency of existing security measures); see also Lawrence W. Sherman & Jody Klein,
Major Lawsuits over Crime and Security: Trends and Patterns, 1958-1982, at 51 (1984) (un-
published research report, University of Maryland) (on file with the University of Maryland
School of Law) (finding that of 186 security related lawsuits, the "lion's share" related to the
failure to prevent crime).
193 See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1166-67.
114 See 5 U.S.C. § 3108 (2004); see also Joh, supra note 87 (discussing the history of
government hostility to private policing). At the time that this Article was written, Congress
was in the midst of considering the Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act
of 2003, which would permit private police companies to request a criminal background
check, based upon FBI records, on prospective employees. See Private Security Officer Em-
ployment Authorization Act of 2003, S. 1743, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Private Security
Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2003: Hearing on S. 1743 Before the House




1. The Superficiality of State Involvement
Federal constitutional law regulates the daily work of the public po-
lice: the constraints found in the text of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution,'" applied to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the exclusionary
rules of evidence employed to reinforce them, as well as the restraints on
interrogation provided for in Miranda v. Arizona.196 (Many state constitu-
tions also contain corresponding provisions.) Perhaps no other single occu-
pation is so pervasively regulated by federal constitutional law as the public
police. In order for the rules of constitutional criminal procedure to apply,
however, it is first necessary to determine whether or not any activity at-
tributable to government, or "state action," is present, either because the
party charged with depriving another of a "right or privilege created by the
State" has "acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state of-
ficials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.' 97 Be-
cause courts rarely examine the state action principle with regard to the po-
lice, we lack a body of law setting forth the circumstances in which private
may be distinguished rationally from public. 198 As one consequence, the
police discussed in criminal procedure are presumptively the public police.
This result cannot be attributed to a careful parsing of the doctrine it-
self. As it has been developed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the state action
doctrine, in the abstract, provides the analytical tools that permit a close re-
view of private police action. The Court has identified the following three
guiding factors:
195 The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that "[n]o person ... shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Finally, the relevant language of the Sixth Amendment acknowledges the criminal defen-
dant's right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI;
see also Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1230-31.
196 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). Public police are also subject to the administrative and
tort laws of the states in which they work. As noted earlier, I focus here on restraints im-
posed by federal constitutional law.
197 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
198 See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1230 ("The state action problem in criminal procedure
has been largely neglected both by constitutional scholars and by criminal procedure schol-
ars.").
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in determining whether a particular action or course of conduct is governmental in
character, it is relevant to examine the following: [1] the extent to which the actor re-
lies on governmental assistance and benefits, [2] whether the actor is performing a
traditional governmental function, and [3] whether the inoury caused is aggravated in a
unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.
In discussing the potential applicability of these legal tests to private
policing, David Sklansky observes that judging the private police by any of
these three factors would classify them as state actors. 20 0 Yet in practice,
lower courts have given only superficial review to the state action doctrine
where private policing is concerned: "virtually everything turns on whether
the state has vested private personnel with an official title."2 0 ' Moreover, in
defining the boundaries of state action, courts have been more concerned
with the line distinguishing public police from all other people, rather than
with private police as a separate category warranting distinct legal status.
Thus, my intention here is not to retread the ground cleared by others re-
garding the hypothetical applicability of the state action doctrine to private
policing. 2  Much of that scholarship takes the view that the state action
doctrine, if carefully applied, would qualify private police as state actors.
Instead, the following sections focus on those laws that do regulate private
199 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991) (internal citations
omitted).
200 See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1250.
201 See id. at 1246.
202 For an excellent review of the inconsistencies of the state action doctrine as devel-
oped by the Supreme Court, see Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1247-65; see also student notes
listed supra Part I. In particular, many commentators have noted that the Court's explana-
tion of the "public function" doctrine in the case of Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-07
(1946), provides a justification, in theory, for classifying private police as state actors. See,
e.g., John M. Burkoff, Not So Private Searches and the Constitution, 66 CORNELL L. REv.
627, 644-58 (1981); R. Scott Palmer, Comment, Sticky Fingers, Deep Pockets, and the Long
Arm of the Law: Illegal Searches of Shoplifters by Private Merchant Security Personnel, 55
OR. L. REv. 279, 283 (1976); Note, Private Assumption of the Police Function Under the
Fourth Amendment, 51 B.U. L. REv. 464, 474-75 (1971); Note, Seizures by Private Parties:
Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REv. 608, 617 (1967). In Marsh, the Court re-
versed a decision holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments did not apply to the pri-
vately owned company town of Chickasaw, Alabama. 326 U.S. at 509-10. Likening the
town's status to privately owned bridges and ferries in which the "operation is essentially a
public function," the Court did not find the wholly private ownership of the town determina-
tive of the state action question. Id. at 506. In theory, Marsh would permit the application
of the state action doctrine to wholly private police forces that had also adopted an essen-
tially public function. Neither the Supreme Court, nor the lower courts, however, have
shown a receptivity to this extension of Marsh in the half century since its decision. In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court appears to have severely limited Marsh itself to its facts. See
Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1255 (citing Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 332 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting)).
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police conduct. These rules, in sum, have resulted in the near absolute legal
separation between private and public that belies the complex interrelation-
ship between them described in the previous Part.
a. The Inapplicability of Federal Constitutional Law
Because there are few legal distinctions made between private police
and other private actors (excluding special deputies and off-duty public po-
lice), it is useful to discuss first those Supreme Court decisions that have
contrasted the actions of public police and private actors.
The Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment to private action almost a century ago, in Burdeau v. McDowell.
20 3
The employers of J.C. McDowell, a director of a natural gas company, sus-
pected him of fraud. A company representative and a private detective
raided McDowell's Pittsburgh office and obtained incriminating docu-
ments.2 °4 McDowell filed a petition in district court to seek return of his
papers and to obtain an order barring their use before a grand jury.20 5
Reversing the district court's ruling in McDowell's favor, the Court
found that the Fourth Amendment did not apply in the case because, even if
the seizures were illegal, "no official of the federal government had any-
thing to do with the wrongful seizure of the petitioner's property. 20 6 The
"origin and history" of the Fourth Amendment's protections against unlaw-
ful searches and seizures, the Court reasoned, showed that "it was intended
as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not in-
tended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies. 20 7 Ac-
cordingly, because McDowell's papers were seized by persons "uncon-
nected with the government," these actions, even if wrongful, did not
prevent the introduction of the evidence in McDowell's prosecution.20 8 In
the years since that decision, the Court, citing Burdeau, has repeatedly reaf-
firmed the principle that the Fourth Amendment does not apply where "a
private party ... commits the offending act.,
20 9
With respect to the Fifth Amendment, the Court has addressed the
state action requirement more recently, in Colorado v. Connelly.210 There,
203 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
204 See id. at 470-71.
205 See id.
206 Id. at 475.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 476.
209 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976) (citing Burdeau, 256 U.S. at
475).
210 479 U.S. 157, 157 (1986).
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the Court characterized "coercive [public] police activity" as a "necessary
predicate" to finding a confession involuntary under the Fifth Amendment
or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 11 Accordingly,
the lower courts have rejected claims that the prophylactic protections of
the Miranda decision to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination must apply to interrogations conducted by private police.
212
Finally, although the Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the
question of whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to inter-
rogations conducted by private police or other private actors, the lower
courts have uniformly held the amendment inapplicable.2 13 This uniformity
is consistent with the Supreme Court's suggestion that the Sixth Amend-
ment prohibits only action by "[public] police and their informant[s]" that is
"designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks."
2 1 4
b. Private Police Before the Supreme Court
Although private police appear as background characters in a number
of significant Supreme Court decisions,21 5 the Court has addressed the con-
stitutional status of private police only twice. In each case the Court found
that private police action was properly attributable to the state. While those
conclusions may suggest that the Court was sensitive to private police
power, closer examination shows that, in each case, the Court's decision
rested upon formalistic ideas of public and private.
The Court first briefly considered the constitutional status of private
police in Williams v. United States,21 6 before addressing the main issue in
the case, whether the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242,217 providing for
211 Id. at 167. Connelly narrowed the suggestion of the Court in Brain v. United States,
168 U.S. 532 (1897), that the Fifth Amendment barred use of a coerced confession against a
federal defendant, no matter who had conducted the interrogation. Connelly, 479 U.S. at
176; see also Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1232.
212 See discussion infra note 250 and accompanying text.
213 See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1233 (collecting cases).
214 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986).
215 See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66-68 (2003) (describing how Kmart se-
curity officers apprehended Leandro Andrade twice for shoplifting, eventually resulting in
his "third strike" sentence of two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life); United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 670 (1985) (describing how the government's case against
Bagley rested principally on the testimony of two "state law-enforcement officers em-
ployed... as private security guards" who assisted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms in an undercover operation).
216 341 U.S. 97, 99-101 (1951).
217 At the time of the case, the statute provided that:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
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criminal penalties to persons who "under color of law" violated the civil
rights of others, could be applied in comportment with the Constitution to
the use of the "third degree" by a private police officer.218 (The statutory
element of action taken "under color of law," found in § 242 and in other
federal statutes, is equivalent to the state action requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment.) 219 The defendant, Jay G. Williams, operated his own
private detective agency in Miami, Florida.22° Concerned about thefts of
lumber, the Dania Supply Company hired Williams to investigate the mat-
ter.221 Williams placed three men in his own employ on the lumber com-
pany's payroll to spy on the company's employees.222 Eventually, Williams
and his men identified four men as thieves and used a "rubber hose, a pistol,
a blunt instrument, a sash cord and other implements" to obtain confessions
from three of them.223 Present at the beatings was also one Ford, a public
police officer dispatched from the Miami Police Chief to assist in the inves-
tigation.224  It developed that Williams himself possessed a quasi-public
status; he had taken an oath and was qualified by the city of Miami as a
special police officer, although he received no payment from the city.
225
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United
States... shall be fined not more than S 1000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Id. at 98 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1946)).
218 See United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 71 (1951), aff'g 179 F.2d 644 (5th Cir.
1950) ("[At the company's shack] the investigators subjected [the accused men] to the famil-
iar 'third-degree' which, after blows, kicks, threats, and prolonged exposure to a brilliant
light, yielded 'confessions."').
219 See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) ("Like the
state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state law element
of § 1983 excludes from its reach 'merely private conduct .... ') (citations omitted); see
also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. of the Arts, 531 U.S. 288, 296 n.2 (2001)
("If a defendant's conduct satisfies the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the conduct also constitutes action 'under color of state law' for § 1983 purposes.")
(quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982)).
220 Williams, 341 U.S. at 98.
221 Williams v. United States, 179 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1950), aff'd by United States v.
Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951). On the evolution of the police interrogation tactics from the
"third degree" to non-physical psychological techniques, see generally Richard Leo, Police
Interrogation in America, A Study of Violence, Civility, and Social Change (1994) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with the Northwestern
University Transportation Library).
222 Williams, 179 F.2d at 646.
223 Williams, 341 U.S. at 98.
224 Williams, 179 F.2d at 646.
225 Williams, 341 U.S. at 98.
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Williams, two of his employees, Ford, and a lumber company employee
were indicted on four counts under § 242; Williams alone was convicted.22 6
The Supreme Court affirmed Williams' conviction and rejected his
challenge that the obtainment of confessions by force could not be reached
by the statute.227 Prior to doing so, the Court found "it clear that petitioner
was acting 'under color' of law within the meaning of [the statute]. 228
While the participation by Ford, a public police officer, further supported
the finding of state involvement in the investigation, the Court found most
relevant the fact that Williams himself was cloaked with state authority.
Noting that it was "common practice ... for private guards or detectives to
be vested with policemen's powers," the Court concluded that Williams
"was asserting the authority granted him and not acting in the role of a pri-
vate person. 2 29
Thirteen years later, the Court again was called upon to resolve the
constitutional status of a private police officer in Griffin v. Maryland.23 0 On
June 30, 1960, five black students-William L. Griffin, Marvous Saunders,
Michael Proctor, Cecil T. Washington, Jr., and Gwendolyn Greene2
3 1 -
sought to protest the policy of the Glen Echo Amusement Park in Maryland
to "exclude Negroes who wished to patronize its facilities., 232 When they
attempted to board the Park's carousel, the defendants were approached by
Francis Collins, an employee of the National Detective Agency. The Park
had entered into a "'protection' contract" with the Agency.233 Collins wore
an Agency uniform with a deputy sheriff's badge, for he had been deputized
234at the request of the park management. Maryland law provided for those
appointed as "special deputy sheriffs" to possess the "same power and au-
thority as deputy sheriffs possess within the area to which they are ap-
226 Williams, 179 F.2d at 646. The remaining defendants were acquitted. Id. A new in-
dictment was returned against all the defendants charging them with conspiracy to deprive
others of their civil rights, under 18 U.S.C. § 241. Id. In a companion case to the one dis-
cussed in the text, supra, a plurality of the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's deter-
mination that § 241 applied "only to interference with rights which arise from the relation of
the victim and the Federal Government, and not to interference by State officers with rights
which the Federal Government merely guarantees from abridgment by the States." Williams,
341 U.S. at 81-82.
227 Williams, 341 U.S. at 104.
228 Id. at 99.
229 Id. at 99-100.
230 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
231 Griffin v. State, 171 A.2d 717, 718 (Md. 1961).
232 Griffin, 378 U.S: at 131.
233 Griffin, 171 A.2d at 718.
234 Griffin, 378 U.S. at 132.
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pointed .... ,,235 After Griffin and his colleagues refused to leave at
Collins' request, he arrested them for trespass.236
The five Griffin defendants argued that their convictions for trespass
violated the Equal Protection Clause as racially discriminatory action.
Maryland's highest state court rejected their claim because it found that
state action could not be attributed to Collins' arrest of the defendants.
Collins' deputization, in the court's view, "did not alter his status as an
agent or employee of the operator of the park., 237 Under Maryland law,
Collins was entitled, regardless of his special deputy status, to conduct a
238citizen's arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his presence.
The Supreme Court reversed the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision.
Although Collins was not a public employee, he "wore a sheriffs badge
and consistently identified himself as a deputy sheriff rather than as an em-
ployee of the park," and thus, according to the Court, qualified as a state ac-
tor.239 Having established the necessary predicate of state action, the Court
then found that the arrest had violated the Equal Protection Clause because
it constituted public enforcement of a private policy of racial discrimina-
tion. Rejecting the argument that Collins was "simply enforcing the park
management's desire to exclude designated individuals from the premises,"
the Court instead found significant that the Park's management had specifi-
cally instructed the special deputy, who held himself out as a deputy sheriff,
"to arrest Negroes for trespassing if they did not leave the park when he or-
dered them to do so. ' '24 ° Griffin left unanswered, however, the constitu-
tional status of a private police officer who did not identify himself as a
public official, or who performed policing duties but had not been depu-
tized.
241
235 Id. at 132 n.1.
236 Id. at 133.
237 Griffin, 171 A.2d. at 720-21.
23 Id. at 721.
239 Griffin, 378 U.S. at 135. A year after Griffin, the Court denied certiorari in Drews v.
Maryland, which presented facts similar to those of Griffin: a group of blacks and whites
who were arrested for refusing to leave an amusement park that excluded blacks. Dissenting
from the denial of certiorari, Chief Justice Warren noted that the guard in Drews might have
had the same quasi-public status as the guard in Griffin. Drews v. Maryland, 381 U.S. 421,
426 n.6 (1965) (Warren, C.J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
240 Griffin, 378 U.S. at 137.
241 Sklanksy finds Griffin a "paradoxical decision":
The state's complicity in the amusement park's policy of segregation seems dependent, in the
Court's view, upon the merging of the roles of landowner's agent and police officer in one indi-
vidual. Moreover... it strongly suggested that Collins qualified as a state actor only because he
held himself out as one: the result might have been different, the majority implied, if Collins had
not worn a badge, and [if he] had relied specifically on his power of citizen's arrest.
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Any hope that Griffin would give rise to a body of law regarding other,
non-deputized private police was extinguished fourteen years later in Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks.242 There, the Court considered whether a self-help provi-
sion in New York state law granted to private merchants qualified as state
action, and thus subjected that conduct to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court answered no. One exchange between
the Justices on state action is particularly noteworthy. In his dissent, Justice
Stevens observed that "it is clear the maintenance of a police force is a
unique sovereign function, and the delegation of police power to a private
party will entail state action. '243 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
rejected Stevens' interpretation of Griffin:
Contrary to Mr. Justice Stevens' suggestion, this Court has never considered the pri-
vate exercise of traditional police functions. In Griffin v. Maryland, the State con-
tended that the deputy sheriff in question had acted only as a private security em-
ployee, but this Court specifically found that he "purported to exercise the authority of
a deputy sheriff." Griffin thus sheds no light on the constitutional status of private po-
lice forces, and we express no opinion here. 
24 4
In sum, on the few occasions that the Court has considered the status
of private policing, it has resolved the matter in a way that is least helpful to
lower courts to guide their decision-making. Critical to the Court's deci-
sions in both Williams and Griffin is the formal delegation of special legal
powers to private police. Deputization confers upon otherwise private ac-
tors the formal attributes of public police, and thus the privileges of these
powers carry with them the constraints of constitutional law. Yet in neither
case does the Court hint at how the constitutional status of private police
should be resolved in the absence of deputization, nor whether such consid-
eration might be different where substantive law other than the Equal Pro-
tection Clause or § 242 would be involved. Moreover, as we have seen, the
delegation of formal peace officer powers is only one resource among many
for the private police. Disempowerment cannot be inferred from its ab-
sence.
Sklanksy, supra note 6, at 1238-39.
242 436 U.S. 149 (1978); see also Sklanksy, supra note 6, at 1239.
243 436 U.S. at 172 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244 Id. at 163 n. 14 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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c. Private Policing in the Lower Courts
i. LOWER COURTS AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
With the state action jurisprudence and the other few cases in which
the Supreme Court has addressed the status of private police, the lower
courts have cobbled together a body of case law that replicates the strict
boundary between public and private, classifying all public police on one
side, and all private police and ordinary citizens on the other. To reiterate,
these lower court decisions give only a cursory examination of the nature of
the policing challenged. Instead, the absence or presence of special legal
powers is determinative.
With regard to searches, lower courts have generally found that the
Fourth Amendment and its accompanying exclusionary rule do not apply to
private police, unless they have been accorded special deputized powers.
For example, in United States v. Lima,245 Lynn Johnson, a plain-clothes
store detective for a Lord and Taylor department store, watched through the
slats of a fitting room door and observed Adelaide Lima remove the tags
from a blouse and place it in her purse. When Lima left the store, Johnson
approached her, physically restrained her, and escorted her to the store's se-
curity office. Johnson searched Lima and recovered the stolen blouse from
246her purse. 2 6 Although the trial court suppressed evidence of the stolen
blouse in Lima's prosecution for petit larceny, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to "mere em-
ployees performing security duties" and reversed.24 7
Rejecting Lima's argument that private police who "go around 'walk-
ing, talking, acting, and getting paid like policemen"' should be treated as
state actors, the Lima court noted in support of its conclusion that "the fact
that the private sector may do for its own benefit what the state may also do
for the public benefit does not implicate the state in private activity."
248
The essence of Johnson's duties rested in the right of Lord and Taylor "to
protect [its] property from damage and loss." Such businesses, unlike pub-
lic police, "enjoy no special public trust., 249 In its reasoning, Lima is a rep-
resentative case. Other courts have likewise distinguished plant guards,
245 424 A.2d 113 (D.C. Ct. App. 1980); see also Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1240-41.
246 424 A.2d at 115.
247 Id
248 Id. at 121.
249 id.
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store detectives, and private patrols from the public police in the Fourth
Amendment's limitations on searches and seizures.250
Similarly, most courts have held that the prophylactic warnings re-
quired by Miranda v. Arizona in a setting of "custodial police interroga-
tion ,2  are inapplicable when it is private police who conduct questioning.
In City of Grand Rapids v. Impens,252 the private detectives working at the
Grand Rapids Meijer store observed Frederick Impens and two other men
stealing audio tapes. The detectives, one of whom was an off-duty public
officer, approached the three men, escorted them to the store's security of-
fice, and obtained from them signed and completed "Loss Prevention De-
250 See, e.g., Cullom v. State, 673 P.2d 904, 906 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (finding no state
action in a search where the "security guard was not hired or paid by the police and was not
acting in any way in concert with the police"); People v. Taylor, 271 Cal. Rptr. 785, 790
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("A citizen's arrest power presumes that a law-abiding citizen for his
own personal purposes may desire to stop criminal activity just as a merchant has a personal
interest in deterring theft of this goods."); State v. Sanford, 35 P.3d 764, 771 (Haw. Ct. App.
2001) ("The totality of the circumstances in this case clearly show that the [Sears asset pro-
tection agent] conducted a purely private search of [the defendant] immune from Fourth
Amendment... scrutiny."); State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614, 620 (Minn. 1990) (finding
that a search conducted by a security company leading to the defendant's prosecution for
possession of controlled substances was "private, and thus not subject to Fourth Amendment
constraints"); State v. Keyser, 369 A.3d 224, 225-26 (N.H. 1977) (observing that "courts
have usually held that the efforts of private investigators and private security officers acting
independently of governmental officials to obtain evidence of criminal conduct are not sub-
ject to fourth amendment standards and that such evidence will not be excluded from crimi-
nal prosecutions on constitutional grounds"); People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 380 (1968)
(finding that a search by store detectives "had no connection with the police" because they
"seized defendant's pistol in pursuance of their private responsibility to provide security for
the store"); State v. McDaniel, 337 N.E.2d 173, 175 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (holding that a
search by deputized private police was not state action where "[t]hey do not perform their
duties for the benefit of the public but, rather, for the benefit of [their employer]"); see also
Commonwealth v. Leone, 435 N.E.2d 1036, 1040-41 (Mass. 1982) (noting that while a
deputized private officer "is bound to comply with the Fourth Amendment," no violation
occurs when an investigation is "conducted on behalf of the private employer, in a manner
that is reasonable and necessary for protection of the employer's property").
251 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). As the Court stated in Miranda:
Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the [Fifth Amendment] privilege [against
self-incrimination] and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his
right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the fol-
lowing measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id.
252 327 N.W.2d 278 (Mich. 1982).
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partment Voluntary Statements." Impens, eventually charged with disor-
derly conduct, objected to the admission of his signed statement at trial.
The Supreme Court of Michigan held that Miranda warnings were not
required. According to the court, the "Meijer security personnel were
working with the view of furthering their employer's interest only," and
could not be characterized as state actors. 53 Moreover, while there was
some suggestion that the three men detained were nervous when confronted
by Meijer's private police, in the court's view, "the acts of the security
guards did not present the kind of psychological coercion and threatening
environmental custody" addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Miranda.25 4 Other courts have agreed with the general conclusion arrived
at by the Impens court.25 5 Private police, then, are repeatedly deemed no
different than private citizens.
Many courts have been more willing to characterize off-duty public
police officers, privately employed, as retaining their public status, but the
decisions in this area are discordant. 56 Curiously, some state courts have
been willing to classify off-duty police as public actors where they have
been victims of assault or have encountered resistance by the person whom
they arrested. Although these cases do not involve federal constitutional
law, they are nevertheless instructive regarding the judicial interpretation of
253 Id. at 281.
254 Id. Nor did the presence of the off-duty public police officer alter the court's charac-
terization of the private questioning. According to the court, not only was his role in Im-
pens' detention "quite limited," but he also identified himself as a Meijer employee, not a
public police officer. Id. at 282.
255 See, e.g., United States v. Antonelli, 434 F.2d 335, 337 (2d Cir. 1970) ("It would be a
strange doctrine that would so condition the privilege of a citizen to question another whom
he suspects of stealing his property that incriminating answers would be excluded as evi-
dence in a criminal trial unless the citizen had warned the marauder that he need not an-
swer."); Woods v. City Court of the City of Tucson, 626 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981) ("We are not ... inclined to extend Miranda to private activity because it may produce
evidence which may be used in criminal prosecutions."); In re Deborah C., 635 P.2d 446,
449 (Cal. 1981) ("We think that routine detention and questioning by plainclothes store de-
tectives present a substantially different situation [than one involving public police]. Unless
they represent themselves as police they do not enjoy the psychological advantage of official
authority, a major tool of coercion."); People v. Raitano, 401 N.E.2d 278, 281 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) ("[Wle hold that... the statements given to the security guards were not rendered in-
admissible by the alleged failure to give the warnings outlined in Miranda."); People v. John-
son, 422 N.Y.S.2d 296, 300 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1979) (finding no violation of Miranda
where Gimbel's store detectives questioned the defendant, but "were neither acting for the
police nor doing anything pursuant to their request"); State v. Giallombardo, 504 N.E.2d
1202 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (finding Miranda inapplicable to questioning conducted by secu-
rity manager of department store leading to defendant's prosecution).
256 For representative cases, see Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1244; see also Joh, supra note
63 (discussing moonlighting phenomenon).
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the private-public distinction. In these cases, some courts have concluded
that off-duty public officers are always "on-duty," and thus may be seen as
performing their public duties when employed privately. 7  Others have
cited public policy to support the characterization of off-duty public officers
as performing public duties, particularly when officers don their public uni-
forms in their private employment.258 By contrast, a minority of these deci-
sions have found that off-duty public police lose their public status in pri-
vate employment, precisely because of the private payment and assignment
they receive.259
257 See, e.g., Hutto v. State, 304 So.2d 29, 33 (Ala. Crim. App. 1974) (noting that state
law obliges public police to enforce the law at any time, including during private employ-
ment); Meyers v. State, 484 S.W.2d 334, 339 (Ark. 1972) (noting that even a privately paid,
off-duty officer is "on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week"); Lande v. Menage Ltd.
Partnership, 702 A.2d 1259, 1261 (D.C. 1997) (observing that "[m]embers of the police
force are held to be always on duty") (internal quotations omitted); Carr v. State, 335 S.E.2d
622, 623 (Ga. App. 1985) (stating that privately employed off-duty police "carry this duty
[to enforce the law] twenty-four hours a day, on and off duty"); People v. Barrett, 370
N.E.2d 247, 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (observing that status of off-duty officer does not turn
on whether she is "in or out of uniform, [or] employed by a private party or on regular
duty"); State v. Wilen, 539 N.W.2d 650, 659 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that privately
employed police have "a duty to preserve the peace and to respond as police officers at all
times"); State v. Glover, 367 N.E.2d 1202, 1204 (Ohio App. Ct. 1976) (stating that a pri-
vately employed, "duly commissioned police officer holds a public office upon a continuing
basis"); Monroe v. State, 465 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (stating that privately
employed police officer is "on duty 24 hours a day").
258 See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 294 S.E.2d 365, 366 (Ga. App. 1982) ("The practice of
uniformed officers in places susceptible to breaches of the peace deters unlawful acts and
conduct by patrons in those places. The public knows the uniform and the badge stand for
the authority of government."); Wilen, 539 N.W.2d at 660 ("The public expects that a uni-
formed law enforcement officer has the power to enforce the law and to arrest where neces-
sary, powers which a private security guard generally does not possess."); State v. DeSanto,
410 A.2d 704, 705 (N.J. App. Div. 1980) (noting that the public police uniform "has the
same significance to the public whether the wearer is technically on or off duty") (internal
quotations omitted).
259 See, e.g., People in Interest of J.J.C., 854 P.2d 801, 802 (Colo. 1993) (finding no evi-
dence to show that privately paid, uniformed off-duty police was "acting in the regular
course of his assigned duties" when he arrested the defendant); Stewart v. State, 527 P.2d 22,
24 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) ("We believe that when an off-duty police officer accepts pri-
vate employment and is receiving compensation from his private employer he changes hats
from a police officer to a private citizen when engaged in that employment and he is there-
fore representing his private employer's interest and not the public's interest."); see also
Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 595 P.2d 975, 980 (Cal. 1979) (concluding that because state
law prohibits private compensation for public work, off-duty employment requires action as
a private citizen); cf State v. Palms, 592 S.W. 2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that off-
duty reserve officer in private employment not acting in public capacity).
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ii. LOWER COURTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A few states have experimented with imposing greater legal restric-
tions upon private police than is expected of private citizens under their
state constitutions, but these forays into state constitutional law have been
short-lived.260  The California Supreme Court's experience with the 1979
case People v. Zelinski26l is illustrative. Store detectives detained Virginia
Zelinski after observing her shoplift.262 Their search of her revealed a pill
bottle containing heroin, and Zelinski was subsequently prosecuted for pos-
session of a controlled substance.263 The Zelinski court noted that while
statutory citizen arrest powers permitted the detectives to detain or arrest
Zelinski, their search in this case, "to recover goods that were not in plain
view," was illegal.264 Recognizing the "increasing reliance placed upon
private security personnel by local law enforcement authorities for the pre-
vention of crime and enforcement of the criminal law, ' 265 the court held
that, under the state constitutional analogue of the Fourth Amendment,266
the exclusionary rule applied to the illegally obtained evidence when private
police "went beyond their employer's private interests,'267 and thus were
involved in state action. By acknowledging private police as occupying a
category distinct from other private persons-a departure from federal con-
stitutional law-Zelinski was significant.
The decision's promise was quickly extinguished, however. In 1982,
California voters enacted Proposition 8,268 which amended the state consti-
tution269 and prohibited the exclusion of all relevant evidence, except to theextent required by federal law.27 ° Zelinski became a dead letter, and private
260 See also Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1245-46.
261 594 P.2d 1000 (Cal 1979).
262 Id. at 1002.
263 id.
264 Id. at 1004.
265 Id. at 1005.
266 "Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution provides in part that: 'The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable sei-
zures and searches may not be violated ....' Id. at 1004.
267 Id. at 1006.
268 See Jeff Brown, Proposition 8: Origins and Impact-A Public Defender's Perspec-
tive, 23 PAC. L.J. 881, 881 (1992).
269 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(d).
270 See In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 752 (Cal. 1985) ("What Proposition 8 does is to
eliminate a judicially created remedy for violations of the search and seizure provisions of
the federal or state Constitutions, through the exclusion of evidence so obtained, except to
the extent that exclusion remains federally compelled."); see also Collins v. Womancare,
878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he continuing validity of Zelinski has been called
into doubt by the enactment of Proposition 8, which amended California's Constitution to
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police once again stood in the same position as private citizens. Attempts
to extend the exclusionary rule under state constitutional provisions in
Montana and West Virginia during the 1980s were similarly transitory.27'
2. Other Sources of Regulation
In the absence of restrictions based on federal constitutional law, there
are few sources of regulation specifically directed at private policing.
Those that do include state licensing laws, tort law, and self-regulation.
a. State Regulations
Many state legislatures have enacted regulations for private police, but
the scope and extent of these laws vary considerably,272 and none appear to
set standards on policing behavior.273 Consider the regulation of private se-
curity guards, classified by most states to be those engaged in what I have
prohibit California courts, in the absence of express statutory authority, from 'exclud[ing]
evidence seized in violation of either the state or federal Constitution unless exclusion is
compelled by the federal Constitution."') (quoting In re Lance W., 694 P.2d at 752).
271 Compare State v. Muegge, 360 S.E.2d 216 (W.Va. 1987) (holding that the state con-
stitutional analogue to the Fourth Amendment applies to private police acting under the
state's security guard act), with State v. Honaker, 454 S.E.2d 96, 103-4 (W.Va. 1994) (over-
ruling Muegge for the proposition that public police involvement is not necessary to find a
statement involuntary under the state constitution); State v. George Anthony W., 488 S.E.2d
361, 367 n.13 (W.Va. 1996) ("State v. Muegge has been overruled to the extent that it in-
volves arrests by individuals other than the [public] police."). In Montana, the state supreme
court initially extended the exclusionary rule to the acts of private citizens, and not just to
private police. Compare State v. Helfrich, 600 P.2d 816, 819 (Mont. 1979) (holding that
"the right of individual privacy explicitly guaranteed by the State Constitution is inviolate
and the search and seizure provisions of Montana law apply to private individuals as well as
law enforcement officers"), and State v. Hyem, 630 P.2d 202, 206 (1981) ("When private
citizens, acting on their own initiative, unreasonably invade the privacy rights of individuals,
the evidence thus obtained against the other individuals is subject to the exclusionary rule."),
with State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153, 157 (Mont. 1985) ("[W]e hold that the privacy section of
the Montana Constitution contemplates privacy invasion by state action only."), and State v.
Christensen, 797 P.2d 893 (Mont. 1990) (extending the prohibition in Long of the exclusion-
ary rule to non-felonious conduct of private individual to felonious conduct as well).
272 As of 1998, seven states had no statutes regulating security guards. See Jeffrey R.
Maahs & Craig Hemmens, Guarding the Public: A Statutory Analysis of State Regulation of
Security Guards, 21 J. CRIME & JUST. 119, 131 (1998).
273 A handful of states require some training of guards before they may being employ-
ment. A survey conducted in 2003 by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
found that only seven states required security guard applicants to undergo pre-assignment
training of eight hours or more. They are California, North Dakota, Illinois, Alaska, Florida,
Oregon, and Arizona. See SEIU, GRADING SYSTEM (2003) (on file with author).
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elsewhere called protective policing.274 In many states, such regulation
consists of "little more than asking applicants to promise that they are quali-
fied to be a security guard., 275 Some states only have one or two provisions
regarding security guards.276 In a significant minority of states, there is no
state regulation of security guards at all.277
The most common statutory requirements imposed on security guards
mandate fingerprinting and criminal records checks of applicants for guard
jobs. 78 For the most part, state regulations attempt to identify those it
deems unsuitable for private police employment at their initial job applica-
tion, but even in this regard, these regulations succeed only modestly. Me-
dia accounts of former felons receiving private police employment in viola-
tion of these laws are numerous.279 In sum, state regulations provide in
274 By protective policing, I refer to those private police whose primary responsibilities
involve the protection of real or movable private property. See Joh, supra note 63 (providing
a typology of the private police). States also vary in degree to which they regulate private
investigators, either individually or as licensed businesses.
275 Maahs & Hemmens, supra note 272, at 119; see also Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1184
n.84 ("Most states also license and impose administrative regulations on segments of the pri-
vate security industry, but the regulations are generally quite minimal."). Robert Masciola,
of the research department of the SEIU, notes that in conducting their state survey of guard
regulation, "[i]t certainly was an eye-opener when we completed the survey and found how
insufficient state regs were." E-mail from Robert Masciola, Research Department, SEIU
(Feb. 19, 2004) (on file with author).
276 Kansas requires only that applicants be taller than 5'2". See Maahs & Hemmens, su-
pra note 272, at 13 1.
277 In their survey of state laws regulating security guards, the SEIU found that eight
states had no regulations regarding training, background checks, or any form of state over-
sight through a regulatory board or agency. See SEIU, supra note 273; see also SEIU,
REPORT CARD ON SECURITY STANDARDS: MOST STATES ARE FAILING, available at
http://www.seiu.org/building/security/statesecuritygrades.cfm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004);
Hall, supra note 2, at IA (reporting that state laws regulating guards are "spotty").
278 See Maahs & Hemmens, supra note 272, at 130; Stephanie Armour, In Guards We
Trust, But Should We?, USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2001, at BI (reporting that as of 2001, only
twenty-three states required both a federal and state background check for security guard
applicants).
279 See, e.g., Ray Long et al., Security Laws Face Scrutiny, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 2001, at 1
(reporting that "thousands of people with criminal backgrounds [have been hired] to work as
private guards in Illinois"); Phil McCombs, On His Guard, WASH. POST, May 14, 2002, at
Cl (listing instances of former felons employed as security officers); Tom Topousis, Guards
& Monsters, Ex-Cons Work Security at Retirement Housing, N.Y. POST, Nov. 10, 2003, at 9
(reporting of senior housing development illegally employing guards with criminal records);
Anthony Twhyman & John P. Martin, Breaches Persist in Security at Airports, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 17, 2001, at 1 (reporting that the Argenbright corporation con-
tinued to employ convicted criminals as airport security workers after a prior investigation).
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most cases only the most cursory of checks for security guards, and only
when they first apply for employment.28 °
b. State Tort Law
State tort law provides civil remedies to those who claim injury at the
hands of private police action, but the scope of these measures is also lim-
ited. Where, for example, a private police officer detains or arrests without
legal authorization, that officer is subject to liability for false arrest. 281 Re-
covery against a private police officer who has acted reasonably (although
erroneously) and with probable cause, however, is "likely to be quite low-
which may explain why such cases appear to be rare." 28 2 Good faith will
defeat punitive damages and mitigate actual damages.283 In addition, many
"merchant's privilege" statutes, permitting private police to detain briefly
persons suspected of shoplifting, immunize merchants and their private po-
lice from false arrest or imprisonment liability.2 84
280 Most courts that have reviewed the issue have found that licensing does not turn pri-
vate police into state actors. See, e.g., City of Grand Rapids v. Impens, 327 N.W.2d 278,
281 (Mich. 1982) ("We do not believe that the mere licensing of security guards constitutes
sufficient government involvement to require the giving of Miranda warnings."). But see
Khalil Abdullah, Mercer Must Release Crime Reports, MACON TELEGRAPH, Jan. 27, 2004
(reporting the ruling of a Georgia state court that Mercer University must comply with the
state's Freedom of Information laws regarding a request for crime records on the basis that
its privately paid, deputized police, are certified by a state organization and are thus state
actors).
281 See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1183. As causes of action, false arrest and false im-
prisonment have been deemed "virtually indistinguishable." See 32 AM. JUR. 2D False Im-
prisonment § 3 (2003). Where force is involved in the illegal detention or arrest, the officer
may also be charged with assault. Also, a search of private property without the owner's
consent can also expose a private police officer to liability for trespass. See Sklansky, supra
note 6, at 1183.
282 Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1186. For a different view, see Private Police Forces: Le-
gal Powers and Limitations, supra note 6, at 555 (noting that suits against private police are
"quite common," based on an interview with a private police executive). By contrast, public
police officers who act reasonably and in good faith, even if they make a mistake about what
is "objectively legally reasonable," are granted immunity from tort or criminal liability for
false arrest. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644 (1987).
283 See Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1186.
284 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 477 S.E.2d 631, 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
(finding that the challenged detention was reasonable under the state's merchant's privilege
statute); Ashcroft v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 588 N.E.2d 280 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(finding probable cause to justify detention pursuant to the state's merchant's privilege stat-
ute); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Resendez, 962 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. 1998) (finding a detention
reasonable under the state's "shopkeeper's privilege" statute); Johnson v. K-Mart Enter-
prises, 297 N.W.2d 74 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a detention by a security guard




Finally, the studies sponsored by the Department of Justice propose yet
another source of private police control apart from legal regulation: the
adoption of voluntary guidelines, enacted and enforced by the private police
agencies themselves. Private policing agencies support such guidelines be-
cause they forestall more sweeping external efforts by courts and legisla-
tures. Experience with self-regulation, however, suggests that it is unlikely
to provide a meaningful system of controls. The 1990 Hallcrest Report, for
example, suggests that private police agencies in the United States might
follow the British Security Industry Association (BSIA) in adopting na-
tional, "industry-imposed" regulations. 85 In 1992, Les Johnston examined
the internal regulatory practices of the BSIA, which includes 124 of the
largest British companies providing private police.286 Member companies
are required to submit to inspections and to background checks of their em-
ployees.28 7 Adverse results can lead to disciplinary hearings and penal-
ties.288 Johnston found, however, that in practice, expulsions were rare, and
inspections were always pre-arranged. 28 9 Assessing the state of British self-
regulation in private policing, Johnston concluded that the existing regime
was ineffective in producing any true mechanisms of control or accountabil-
ity.2 90 A study conducted eight years later also determined that there yet ex-
isted "no general regulation of the private security industry in Great Brit-
ain.' 291
In the United States, the American Society for Industrial Security, the
largest national professional association for private police,292 abolished its
Standards and Codes Committee in 1981 .293 The authors of the Hallcrest
(Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (reversing summary judgment for defendants where the evidence re-
garding the reasonableness of the detention had to be resolved at trial).
285 See THE HALLCREST REPORT, supra note 22, at 152.
286 See Les Johnston, Regulating Private Security, 20 INT'L J. Soc. L. 1 (1992).
287 See id. at 6.
288 See id.
289 See id. at 5-6.
290 See id.
291 See GEORGE & BurTON, supra note 29, at 174.
292 My reference to "professional" is borrowed from ASIS's own literature. Whether or
not private policing has achieved the status of a profession warrants a discussion beyond the
scope of this article. For an overview of the process of professionalization, see Bernard Bar-
ber, Control and Responsibility in the Powerful Professions, 93 POL. SCt. Q. 599 (1978);
Harold L. Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, 70 AM. J. Soc. 137 (1964); see
also Ernest J. Criscuoli, Jr., The Time Has Come to Acknowledge Security as a Profession,
1998 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POLl. Scl. 98 (Jul. 1988).
293 See HALLCREST REPORT, supra note 22, at 151.
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Report attribute the elimination to fears that codified standards would lead
to increased liability against the group's members.294 More recently, ASIS
issued an Officer Selection and Training Guideline in October 2003 for use
by legislators in setting minimum guidelines for "private security offi-
cers." 295 The results of these suggestions, including the likeliness of their
adoption and prospects for their success, have yet to be examined.
Both British and American experiences suggest that self-regulation can
at best provide only a supplement to external legal controls. Moreover,
proposed industry self-regulation focuses almost entirely on criteria for
qualifications and training. None address private police behavior in the
way that constitutional criminal procedure law does for the public police.
3. The Regulatory Regime of Private Policing
In sum, the rules regarding private policing are designed for a world in
which public and private are easily distinguishable, and more importantly,
one in which public police are unquestionably the dominant organization
responsible for control of crime and the protection of persons and property.
Only the latter, in this view, are considered the "police." The process of
drawing this distinction is reenacted by every successive legal decision. In
determining the law of criminal procedure, courts do not merely "find" state
involvement, they shape and reinforce its content.
One might point out that one function clearly distinguishes public from
private: law enforcement. Does a law enforcement objective justify the dis-
tinction between the private and public police that now exists? While initi-
ating the criminal process is a task we entrust to the public police, it is not
the only one. What is more, private police often do play a role in producing
cases for the criminal justice system. The remainder of public police work
is functionally indistinct from that of private policing. Yet, the existing law
classifies most private police with nosy neighbors, vindictive associates,
and other private citizens. 296 So too have legal scholars failed to disentan-
294 See id.
295 See AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER
SELECTION AND TRAINING GUIDELINE, at http://www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelines-
private.pdf (last visited Sep. 28, 2004).
296 Cf City of Grand Rapids v. Impens, 327 N.W.2d 278, 284 (Mich. 1982) (Kavanagh,
J., dissenting) ("Unlike the little old lady next door who has a desire to assist in law en-
forcement, private security guards are in the business of law enforcement. It is the nature of
the activities of private security guards that distinguishes them from private persons."); Ste-
ven Euller, Private Security and the Exclusionary Rule, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 649,
665 (1980) ("A private citizen who grabs another person and empties his coat pocket is per-
forming a police role in only the most superficial sense.").
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gle private police from ordinary citizens: a conceptual choice that muddles
analysis.297
How are private police different than ordinary citizens? First, for pri-
vate police, policing is an occupational objective, not a voluntary task.
While courts often refer to the citizen power of arrest, theory is not practice.
The vast majority of citizens would probably be hard pressed, for instance,
to recall an occasion on which they followed credit card thieves, 298 or pur-
sued armed robbers and searched them.299 Second, private police are, to
varying degrees, trained to behave like the public police. While the status
associated with retired public police officers are the most obvious example,
the authority conferred by symbolic representations (badges, uniforms, and
sometimes firearms) should not be underestimated. Third, private police
are more like public police and less like private citizens because they are, to
stretch Marc Galanter's usage, "repeat players" who possess incentives to
use legal rules strategically.300 It is doubtful that most private citizens are
familiar with criminal procedure law, while many private police can and do
use their knowledge of it to their advantage. Ultimately, the classification
of private police with ordinary private persons obscures the significant dif-
ferences between them.
30 1
297 Thus, for example, in his treatise on the Fourth Amendment, Wayne Lafave con-
cludes that the exclusionary rule would "not likely deter the private searcher, who is moti-
vated by reasons independent of a desire to secure criminal conviction and who seldom en-
gages in searches upon a sufficiently regular basis to be affected by the exclusionary
sanction." WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.8 (2003) (emphasis added). Such
comments implicitly classify ordinary citizens, who may never engage in police-like activity,
with private police.
298 See, e.g., Sizemore v. State, 483 N.E.2d 56, 57 (Ind. 1985).
299 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Corley, 491 A.2d 829, 830 (Pa. 1985) (noting that after
hearing of a shooting and robbery, a department store guard "followed appellant out of the
store, across the street, and into Gimbel's department store," where the guard detained,
handcuffed, and searched the defendant for weapons).
300 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves " Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974) (analyzing why "repeat players" in law have
much larger influence in legal change than "one shotters," those who are involved in law-
suits only infrequently).
301 In its petition for rehearing in the Zelinski case, the State of California criticized the
state supreme court's very attempt to distinguish private police from citizens as futile:
"[T]his Court has created a rank of third-class citizens. Security personnel are, therefore,
accorded only the lesser powers of private citizens and the greater disabilities of public po-
lice. The conclusion is illogical." Petition for Rehearing at 4, Zelinski (Crim. 20284).
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Law takes little account of these distinctions.30 2 In their review of pri-
vate police action, most courts give too much evaluative weight to the for-
mal attributes of private police, placing heavy emphasis on whether they
have been granted special legal powers. Nor have legislatures filled in the
gaps left by constitutional law. A minority of courts have recognized that
"[p]rivately employed security forces pose a difficult problem of distinction
between State and private action." 30 3 The rest maintain a boundary that ill
comports with the picture of private policing we now possess.
Table 1
The Relationship Between State Action, Arrest, and Policing
WHO POLICES? WHO BENEFITS? RESULT
The reemergence of
A. Private police Public police the silver platter doc-
trine
Private and Undermining state
B. Private and public public action?
The unimportance of
. the exclusionary rule
B. THE CENTRALITY OF ARREST: SOME UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE
Like the superficiality of state involvement, the centrality of arrest ob-
scures much of private police activity from legal oversight. Consider again
the primary mechanism of control over public police action developed by
the courts: the exclusionary rule.30 4 It operates indirectly through the sup-
pression of illegally obtained evidence from the criminal defendant's trial.
The exclusionary rule is tied to state involvement, for it pertains only to
public police behavior. More specifically, the exclusionary rule only ad-
dresses public police behavior that has led to arrest and, subsequently,
prosecution. The central role of the public police in initiating the criminal
302 In this respect, I part company from more sanguine interpretations of the differential
treatment of public and private police. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1272 (describing
the two legal regimes as "ideal for cross-fertilization" and "perfectly suited for dialectical
development").
303 Commonwealth v. Leone, 435 N.E.2d 1036, 1039 (Mass. 1982).
304 Of course, there exist also tort and criminal actions that may be brought against public




process and the task of controlling public police action are thus deeply in-
tertwined.
Because I have emphasized the contrast between an inflexible legal
distinction and the actual permeability of private-public relationships, con-
sideration of cases that lie at the public-private border can be instructive.
Examples of such cases illustrate how the divide creates opportunities for
exploitation of the existing law, and leaves gaps where the law has no ap-
plication. Table 1 shows in brief the examples to be discussed: the police
organization that procures the evidence, the police organization that makes
use of it, and the application of the relevant law upon that evidence. My
purpose here is less to argue for an expansion or elimination of the state ac-
tion doctrine-a proposal that is probably politically and practically infea-
sible305-but rather to examine the consequences of two starkly different
legal conceptions of the police.
1. The Reemergence of the Silver Platter Doctrine
Consider the reemergence of the "silver platter doctrine., 30 6 The term
refers to an anomaly of federalism that developed in 1914, in Weeks v.
United States.30 7 In that case, the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary
rule to federal officials for violating the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights. The rule did not, however, apply to local (non-federal) police.
30 8
Indeed, in Wolf v. Colorado,3 °9 the Court squarely addressed the issue, and
declined to find the exclusionary rule constitutionally compelled against lo-
cal police in state courts. As a result, until 1960, these police could obtain
evidence in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights and offer their
federal colleagues--on a "silver platter"-that same evidence for use in a
federal prosecution. 310  Such deliberate manipulation of the federal-state
305 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 556
(1985) (arguing for elimination of state action requirement but pessimistic about likelihood
of its adoption).
306 The term was first used in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
307 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
301 See id at 398 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of
such [local] officials. Its limitations reach the Federal government and its agencies.").
309 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
310 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 210 (1960) ("[T]he Weeks case also an-
nounced, unobtrusively but nonetheless definitely, another evidentiary rule. Some of the
articles used as evidence against Weeks had been unlawfully seize by local police officers
acting on their own account. The Court held that the admission of this evidence was not er-
ror for the reason that 'the 4th Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of such
officials."') (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398).
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distinction was legally permissible. Finally, in Elkins v. United States,3 1
the Court discredited the practice, and prohibited the use of evidence in fed-
eral court that had been illegally obtained by local police. There remained a
final exception, a "reverse silver platter," in which evidence illegally ob-
tained by federal officials could be used in state court proceedings, for
which the Court had not yet required the exclusionary rule's use. Eventu-
ally, in Mapp v. Ohio,3 12 the Court closed that loophole too,3 3 and in 1961
applied the exclusionary rule to state courts. No evidence illegally obtained
by either federal or local officials can be used in federal or state court.314
In eliminating the silver platter doctrine, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that restricting the actions of some police (federal) but not others (lo-
cal) created perverse incentives for local police to do legally what federal
officials could not. Such incentives now exist between public and private.
Legal scholarship has almost entirely ignored the last version of an issue
that once provoked heated debate when it involved federal and local po-
lice.315 Sociologist Gary Marx points out that a system of "hydraulic" pres-
sures, virtually identical to the line of cases that led from Wolf to Mapp, ex-
ists in the differing structures of private and public police regulation.
Increased restraint on the public police results in greater reliance on the pri-
vate police to perform "dirty work."316 In practical terms, this means that
311 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
312 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
313 The Court's decision in Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) anticipated Mapp,
although there the Court invoked not constitutional law, but its "supervisory powers over
federal law enforcement officials." Id. at 217-18. In Rea, the petitioner sought in federal
district court to enjoin a federal narcotics agent from testifying in state court on information
derived from a federal search warrant that had already been deemed in violation of then Rule
41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court, agreeing with Rea, reversed
the denial of his motion, and observed that the Federal Rules are "defeated if the federal
agent can flout them and use the fruits of his unlawful act either in federal or state court."
Id. at 218.
314 For a discussion on the development of a silver platter doctrine in an international
context, see Robert L. King, The International Silver Platter Doctrine and the "Shocks the
Conscience" Test: U.S. Law Enforcement Overseas, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 489 (1989).
315 See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 208 n.2 (citing articles). For a notable exception, see Burkoff,
supra note 202, at 631-643. The only scholarship in this area has been limited almost en-
tirely to student notes. For representative examples, see Gagel, supra note 6, at 1841-44
(1995) (discussing the return of the silver platter doctrine in private form); B.C. Petroziello,
Comment, The Platinum Platter Doctrine in Ohio: Are Private Police Really Private? 2 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 275 (1977) (arguing for an extension of the exclusionary rule to Ohio spe-
cial police).
316 Marx, supra note 117, at 185-86. ("Restrict the conditions under which the police can
carry out searches and seizures and undercover activities, coercive interrogation after arrest,
or collect data on those who are not specific subjects, and police may make increased use of
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private police may obtain evidence in ways forbidden to the public police,
and then they may turn over contraband, statements, and other kinds of evi-
dence for use at trial.
In the new version of the silver platter doctrine, private police act, but
public police benefit (Table 1, cell A). How often does this happen? Those
who demand statistics on the frequency of such activity will be disap-
pointed. We know little of the emergence of the new silver platter doctrine,
other than what arises in occasional published opinions.317 Given our ex-
perience with the federal-state example, it is reasonable to estimate that a
comparable level of manipulation probably takes place between private and
public. Indeed, the legal structure of state action and the new organizational
forms of partnership create incentives that permit the circumvention of rules
meant to constrain public police behavior.318
2. Joint Activity
When public police openly and directly control what private police do,
courts have found little trouble finding state action, and therefore the appli-
cability of constitutional criminal procedure law. 319 The same is true when
courts determine that there has been a "joint endeavor" between public and
private, as when a private investigator working for an insurance company
searches a burned home with the local public police, or when private credit
card fraud investigators work together with public police officers. 320 Not all
collaboration is so easily amenable to clear characterization. What happens
in cases where private and public action result in public and private benefits
(Table 1, cell B)?
private detectives and informants who are less accountable and not as subject to such limita-
tions.").
317 See notes supra Part IIl.A.l.c.
318 See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 165, at B2 (observing that, because of close working
relationship to public police, "private security managers may be particularly sympathetic to
law-enforcement requests for help with a criminal investigation").
319 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 34 ("Quite clearly, a search is not private in nature if it
has been ordered or requested by a government official."); see also Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) ("The test . . . is whether [the private party], in light of all
the circumstances of the case, must be regarded as having acted as an 'instrument' or agent
of the state when she produced [incriminating evidence].").
320 See Stapleton v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 100 (1968) ("The search of
petitioner's car was clearly part of a joint operation by the police and the credit card agents
aimed at arresting petitioner and obtaining evidence against him."); State v. Cox, 674 P.2d
1127, 1130 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) ("We hold that were, as here, a law enforcement officer
participates in a joint endeavor as part of an ongoing criminal investigation, the effect is the
same as if he engaged in the undertaking as one exclusively his own.").
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The judicial analysis focusing on direct commands by public to private
police focuses too narrowly on discrete interactions, and not enough on
long-term working relationships. Similarly, criminal procedure scholars
generally focus on matters of "fairness writ small": 321 the obligations of
government to a person accused of a crime, in a particular criminal case.
This microscopic approach provides little guidance for regulating ongoing
relationships between private and piblic police. When public police share
information with private police, is this state involvement?322  Even if it
were, is there any mechanism to ascertain how private police obtain their
information? The "joint endeavor" and "direct control" cases all present
circumstances in which private and public actors are either physically pre-
sent together or explicit about their joint activity, but these cases provide
little guidance about private police action that is more subtly encouraged or
assisted by the public police.323 Thus, Wayne LaFave notes in his treatise
on the Fourth Amendment that "[e]ven where the government encourage-
ment was rather strong and specific, but yet short of an explicit request for a
search, courts have been inclined to declare the search private nonetheless if
there was in addition a legitimate private purpose behind the search., 324 In
other words, the existence of mixed motives encourages a finding of
"purely" private action.
Perhaps the occasional encouragement of private citizens by public po-
lice poses no serious challenges to the current structure of criminal proce-
dure law. But it is arguably another matter when public police encourage
and solicit aid from the private police: persons, sometimes former public
321 Sklansky, supra note 6, at 1280.
322 Cf State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990). In Buswell, the court noted that
"[m]ere antecedent contact between law enforcement and a private party is inadequate to
trigger the application of the exclusionary remedy under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 619
(citing United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 1980)). The "mere antecedent
contact" included:
In May 1998, before the commencement of [the private police employer's] racing season, [pri-
vate police manager] Emerson had conferred in general terms with the Crow Wing County Sher-
iff and the local Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension agent relative to procedures to be
employed for making arrests should security guards of North Country Security uncover illegal
activity during a race meet. This conference results in agreement that if any incident encoun-
tered by North Country Security guards seemed to warrant an arrest for a crime, Emerson would
first be notified, and, he, in tum, would decide whether to call in official law enforcement agen-
cies.
Id. at 616. The facts of Buswell also suggest that in many of these non-joint activity cases,
public police officers know perfectly well that they may receive evidence via the new silver
platter doctrine of which I have spoken, supra.
323 See also LAFAVE, supra note 34.
324 See id.; see also Burkoff, supra note 202, at 628 n.7 (describing the joint endeavor
cases as "inconsistent and confused").
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officers, who typically possess the skills and resources unavailable to the
ordinary private person.
3. Transplanting Criminal Procedure Law
Is the solution, as some have suggested, to expand the state action doc-
trine to apply to more private police activity? The short answer is no, at
least not entirely. Simply transferring the rules of criminal procedure to
private policing may not have the intended effect of controlling their behav-
ior. The modem rationale for the exclusionary rule rests on the presump-
tion that police illegality can be curbed by the threat of excluding relevant
evidence from a defendant's trial.325 This model of deterrence, however,
can be effective only if the presumed incentives-that is, the desire to have
that evidence used against a defendant in her prosecution-exist. What
happens when there is private action for private benefit (Table 1, cell C)?
To address this question, I return to the matter of private justice for two ex-
amples.326
a. The Mass Production of Private Justice
Consider the example of Cumberland Farms, a privately held company
operating 1,100 convenience stores in eleven states.327 Like many other
convenience store companies, Cumberland management considered
"shrink," or employee theft, to be a significant source of revenue loss. 328 Its
325 Thus, while the Supreme Court has in the past cited the exclusionary rule's role in
promoting judicial integrity, today the Court most often refers to the rule's deterrence ration-
ale. Compare Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (observing that the federal
courts should not act as "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are
swom to uphold"), with Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) ("The primary justifica-
tion for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth
Amendment rights."). But see State v. Keyser, 369 A.2d 224, 225 (N.H. 1977) ("One ration-
ale for limiting the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained by government actions is that the
rule will not deter private individuals from engaging in improper conduct because most pri-
vate persons are unaware of the rule and, being motivated by reasons apart from, or in addi-
tion to, a desire to assist in security a criminal conviction, they are under no disciplinary
compulsion to obey fourth amendment requirements. Arguably, this rationale is less com-
pelling when it is applied to the actions of private investigators and security officers whose
primary goals is often to obtain evidence of crimes, who often possess professional knowl-
edge and skill and who conduct searches and seizures on a regular and institutionalized ba-
sis.") (internal citations omitted).
.326 See also supra Part I.C.
327 For an overview of the Cumberland story, see Joan E. Marshall, Comment, The At-
Will Employee and Coerced Confessions of Theft: Extending Fifth Amendment Protection to
Private Security Guard Abuse, 96 DICK. L. REV. 37 (1991).
328 See Frederic M. Biddle, Cumberland Farms Had Policy of Grilling Employees,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 14, 1990, at 8.
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loss prevention officers considered inventory loss exceeding one percent in
329any of its stores to be a problem warranting action. In response, Cumber-
land private police systematically sought to obtain confessions and restitu-
tion from store employees. 330 A memo circulated in 1985 by the head of
Cumberland's Loss Prevention Department to his staff (and later obtained
by newspaper reporters) commended them for a record number of confes-
sions for the month of December, resulting in $100,000 in restitution.33 1 He
reminded Loss Prevention officers that they were expected to obtain no
fewer than thirty confessions per month, and that "'the primary and most
important function' of a security officer is that of interrogator., 332 A former
Cumberland loss prevention manager confirmed the existence of an interro-
gation quota, and added that the basis of selecting employees for interroga-
tion was not direct suspicion but "that they were in a store with a bad inven-
tory report during the period while they worked in the store."
333
There is no evidence that Cumberland police did what public police
unquestionably would have been required to do in the same circumstances:
advise employees of their rights before proceeding with interrogations.
Former Cumberland employees recalled being taken into back rooms and
accused of taking money or merchandise. Accused employees were offered
a choice between signing a confession or facing public prosecution.334
When threatened with public prosecution, most employees preferred con-
fessing or quitting.3 35 In the period from January to June of 1986 alone, the
company police force questioned 2,600 employees-nearly a third of its
workforce-and obtained confessions from 1,492.336 Restitutions paid by
accused employees averaged at $511 per confession. 337 Interviews with
former employees suggested that virtually every one of the more than
329 See Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (D.N.J. 1990).
330 Cumberland's practices came to light after several former employees sued the com-
pany under federal and state racketeering laws. See Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134
F.R.D. 77, 78-79 (D.N.J. 1991).
331 See Dianna Marder, Stores Set Interrogations Quota, Memo Shows, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Sept. 30, 1990, at 1-A.
332 See id.
333 See Biddle, supra note 328, at 8.
334 See Marder, supra note 331, at 8-A.
335 See Dianna Marder, Ex-Clerks Sue Chain Over Claims of Theft, HOUSTON CHRON.
July 15, 1990, at 2. One former employee described how Cumberland investigators threat-
ened him: 'We have you on videotape and visual sighting for stealing merchandise,' he told
me. He said, 'We can bring you upon on charges for this, and it can ruin your college career,
or you can pay us a little cash."' See Frederic M. Biddle, Cumberland v. Its Employees,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 27, 1990, at 21.




30,000 employees called in for questioning between 1976 and 1989 was
subsequently fired.338
Assume for a moment that the prophylactic warnings of Miranda had
been required of the Cumberland police, and that, therefore, these interroga-
tions violated the employees' constitutional rights. Had the exclusionary
rule been applicable to Cumberland Farms' private police staff (resulting in
their having committed a constitutional law violation), it would have done
little to alter their interrogation policy. A judicial sanction excluding the
employees' confessions would have had no feedback effect on Cumberland
policing, so long as the company was satisfied with termination and restitu-
tion as principal sanctions. In addition, while the Cumberland Farms case
may have publicized one of the worst cases of a sustained, official private
interrogation policy, it is probably not unique. 339 Transferring wholesale
the law of criminal procedure to the private police would overlook the dis-
tinct incentives and functions of private police, which are also distinct from
those of private citizens.340 Private justice systems possess their own inter-
nal structure, independent of the criminal justice system. As discussed ear-
lier, avoiding reliance on the public process allows near total control by pri-
vate police over their resolution of problems. 341 Cumberland Loss
Prevention officers sought to obtain confessions and restitutions. Public
prosecution was valuable as a coercive threat against accused employees,
but in many cases embodied no more than that.
338 See Marder, supra note 33 1, at 1-A. Seven years after it was first filed, the lawsuit
against Cumberland ended when the presiding judge approved a $5.5 million settlement be-
tween Cumberland and its former employees. See Store Chain Will Pay Millions to Ex-
Cashiers, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Sept. 9, 1993, at 41.
339 See, e.g., Frederic Biddle, Jordan Marsh Guards Were Pushed to Make Arrests, Pa-
pers Show, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 1990, at 1 (reporting that Jordan Marsh department
store security guards were given dollar amounts quotas to halt shoplifters).
340 Burkoff contends, however, that extension of the exclusionary rule in such cases
would deter public police behavior: "The most significant deterrent effect of applying an ex-
clusionary rule in this setting may well be to discourage law enforcement agents from en-
couraging or entering into unlawful, sub rosa compacts with private actors." See Burkoff,
supra note 202, at 640.
341 See also Susan Guarino Ghezzi, A Private Network of Social Control: Insurance In-
vestigation Units, 30 SOC. PROBS. 521, 528 (1983) ("By being able to successfully deny [in-
surance] claims while circumventing judicial checks and controls, [special private investiga-
tion units are] implicitly granted the power to investigate as they see fit."). Jerome Skolnick
has observed that public police also may shirk, their duty to respect the constitutional rights
of suspects when officers have no intention of referring cases to prosecution. See SKOLNICK,
supra note 18, at 214.
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b. "Justice can be done right in the store"342: The Civil Law Alternative
Private justice need not only be the product of back-room coercion.
Merchants in nearly every state343 may also rely on civil restitution or re-
covery laws to combat shoplifting.3 4 These permit retailers to seek costs
from detained shoplifters, at least for the amount of the item stolen, and in
some states for administrative, legal, and security expenses associated with
the theft as well. 345 While often a low priority for public police depart-
ments, the costs of shoplifting are considerable for merchants: approxi-
mately $13 billion in 2000, according to one estimate.346 In a typical civil
recovery case, 3 the person accused of shoplifting must surrender the item
stolen, and provide the retailer with a name and address in order to be re-
leased from the premises. 348 The retailer then sends the shoplifter a "civil
demand" letter for an amount permitted by state law. In New York, for in-
stance, a retailer is permitted to demand the price of the item, up to fifteen
hundred dollars, plus a penalty not to exceed the greater of either five times
the retail price or seventy-five dollars. 349 Should the shoplifter fail to re-
spond, the retailer may then file a civil action against the shoplifter for
damages. Those targeted only for civil recovery receive no criminal record,
and for this reason, in the view of retail merchants' associations, typically
pay without protest.
350
342 Patrick Rossello, A Retailer's Nightmare, Shoppers and Clerks Who Steal, BALT.
EVENTNG SUN, Aug. 5, 1991, at B7.
343 Delaware has not yet passed a statute. See Audrey J. Aronsohn, Teaching Criminals
the Cost of Crime, 43 SECURITY MGMT. 63, 64 (1999).
344 Civil recovery laws have also been adopted, at least provisionally, in the U.K. See
Fiona Murphy, Consumer: You ll Pay for That, GUARDIAN, June 17, 1999.
345 See, e.g., Anthony F. Shannon, New Civil Penalty Law Strengthens New Jersey's Bat-
tle Against Shoplifters, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J), Aug. 1, 1993, at 5 (describing New
Jersey law as requiring shoplifters to "return the stolen item or repay its full value, along
with up to $150 in damages, court costs and legal fees, if legal proceedings become neces-
sary").
346 See Joanne Kimberlin, New Battle Lines in Shoplifting War, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Nor-
folk, Va.), July 15, 2002, at Al. The discovery of ties between some organized retail theft
("ORT") rings and purported terrorist funding may, however, spark new interest from prose-
cutors and police in shoplifting. See id.; Joanne Kimberlin, The New Face of Shoplifting,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), July 14, 2002, at Al (describing the discovery of a $10
million contraband cigarette group in Charlotte, North Carolina with ties to Hezbollah).
347 See, e.g., Angela Dellisanti, A New Law in the War on Shoplifting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
8, 1993, at 13:9 (describing an example of such a civil recovery case).
348 See Rossello, supra note 342, at B7.
349 See N.Y. General Obligation Law § 11-105(5)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2004). For exam-
ples of other similar state laws, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (2004); N.J. STAT. § 2A:61C-1
(2004); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 134.005 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-44.4 (2004).
350 See Rossello, supra note 342, at B7.
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These civil recovery laws, most of which were enacted during the
1980s and 1990s, 35 I exist independently of the criminal justice system.
That is, civil recovery laws are distinct from alternative sentencing pro-
grams within the criminal justice system that may, for instance, allow resti-
352tution in lieu of incarceration. The choice of whether to pursue civil re-
covery or criminal prosecution (or both) is left to the retailer. From the
merchants' perspective, the choice is an easy one. There are greater incen-
tives to prefer civil recovery over prosecution. 353  Criminal prosecution
yields at most the return of the stolen item (although even this is not always
guaranteed), whereas civil recovery can even be profitable for some busi-
nesses.354 Merchants prefer the administration of demand letters and direct
payment to "the arduous red tape associated with criminal proceedings. 355
With the array of possible remedies for private police and their clients,
the criminal justice system would seem to fall at the bottom of the hierar-
chy. Prosecution requires an expenditure of resources and effort,356 and the
criminal sanction fails to rectify the merchant's economic loss. Moreover,
to the extent that the criminal justice system uniquely offers the state's offi-
cial expression of moral disapproval for an offender's actions, such consid-
erations, as discussed earlier, are remote from the concerns of private police
and their clients.357 Thus, the transplantation of criminal procedure rules to
private policing would be less effective than its advocates have assumed.
351 Nevada passed the first merchant civil remedy law in 1973. See Retailers Are Using
New Weapon to Cut Losses of Shoplifting, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1989. By 1995, Maine was
the 49th state to have passed civil recovery laws. See Doug Kesseli, Laws Target Bad
Checks, Shoplifters, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Me.), Sept. 27, 1995, available at 1995 WL
8769340.
352 See, e.g., Ed Russo, Those Who Attempt to Steal in Eugene, Ore.-Area Face Fines,
Possible Jail Term, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Dec. 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL
31018809 (citing an example of such diversion programs).
353 Richard Hollinger, an expert on retail security, has stated: "With criminal prosecution,
it's a lose-lose situation because the store gets only negative publicity and the shoplifter gets
the stigma of criminal penalty and forfeits employment requiring a criminal-background
check." See Carolyn Hughes Crowley, A Civil Alternative, WASH. POST, May 24, 1994, at
B5.
354 In a trade publication, the loss prevention director of chain of stores, The Children's
Place, stated that civil recovery statutes were a source of revenue, as well as a means of
combating theft. See KERRY SEGRAVE, SHOPLIFTING: A SOCIAL HISTORY 129 (2002) (citing
Michael Hartnett, Paying the Price of Crime, STORES 76, Dec. 1994, at 48, 53).
355 Kathy Barrett Carter, Merchants Could Sue Shoplifters Under Bill Approved by Sen-
ate, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 18, 1993.
356 See Dellisanti, supra note 347, at 1 (reporting that retailers view prosecution as "ex-
pensive because it ties up salesclerks and security officers in municipal court and leaves
valuable merchandise parked in police evidence lockers").
357 See supra Part I.C.
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The centrality of arrest nevertheless strongly influences judicial review
of the private police. An exclusive focus on the relationship between the
private police and the criminal justice system means that courts will see
private and public police as equivalent only to the extent that the former
provide courts with defendants and evidence. Even reform efforts like the
short-lived Zelinski decision of the California Supreme Court, previously
discussed, reflect this presumption. When store detectives called public po-
lice after finding a vial of heroin in Virginia Zelinski's purse, they were, ac-
cording to the court, "utilizing the coercive power of the state. '358 Had the
detectives relied on their private system of justice, as the Cumberland po-
lice did, the court would have had no objection:
Had the security guards sought out only the vindication of the merchant's private in-
terests they would have simply exercised self-help and demanded the return of the sto-
len merchandise. Upon satisfaction of the merchant's interests, the offender would
have been released. By holding defendant for the criminal process and searching her,
they went beyond their private interests.
359
In its broadest application, this means that so long as private police action
does not result in public prosecution, it may permissibly result in "self-
help": civil sanctions, firing, fining, and banning.
360
4. Effects on the Public and Private Police
Not only is the legal divide between public and private overly formal-
istic, it also produces unintended effects on the behavior of both groups.
The two presumptions identified at the beginning of this Part-that is, the
presumed ease of identifying state action and the centrality of arrest as a lo-
cus of regulation-influence both groups of police. The lack of an identifi-
able and discrete set of rules for the private police results in an unfettered
ability to behave organizationally like their public counterparts with fewer
of the legal disabilities.
3 61
358 People v. Zelinski, 594 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Cal. 1979).
359 Id.
360 One alternative may lie in the use of a civil exclusionary rule. See Private Police
Forces: Legal Powers and Limitations, supra note 6, at 572 (suggesting that the adoption of
a civil exclusionary rule has the potential to be more effective in deterring illegal private po-
lice conduct than the extension of the existing exclusionary rule used in criminal cases).
361 See, e.g., Scott & McPherson, supra note 65, at 271-72 (reporting that private police
agencies heads interviewed "felt that legally conferred police power carried with it legal re-
sponsibilities that would place undesirable burdens on their security personnel and substan-
tially restrict their methods of investigation").
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This distinction influences public policing as well. Rather than occupy
two wholly separate spheres, private and public police share multiple ties.
Because many public police move to the private sector after retirement (and
others when off-duty), both groups are linked through a shared occupational
and social culture. Because the law of criminal procedure has led, for better
or worse, towards increased regulation of the daily work of the public po-
lice, as Gary Marx argues, there exist structural pressures, perhaps ones that
can never be measured satisfactorily, of delegating some "dirty work" to the
private police.362 Finally, the support of partnerships between private and
public results in publicly sanctioned cooperation between the two. It seems
a worthy hypothesis that all these factors lead to some strategic manipula-
tion of the private-public borderline enshrined in law.
C. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Many observers agree that the private police are left mostly to regulate
themselves, a situation in stark contrast to the legal environment in which
the public police find themselves. Those who would cloak the private po-
lice with the existing structure of criminal procedure underestimate, how-
ever, some significant differences between the private and public police.
From the available evidence, private police appear to rely much less on the
coercive aspects of policing work, especially arrest, and focus instead, for
example, on a compliance model of policing. Even when they do resort to
detention, arrest, or interrogation, private police do not always work with an
eye toward processing cases for the criminal justice system.
The structure of the rules controlling public police behavior does not
address either of these aspects of private policing. This Part has pointed out
that the centrality of arrest-the assumption that the primary objective of
police work is to generate criminal cases-in criminal procedure law means
that there is diminished emphasis on controlling police behavior that stops
short of arrest. If this creates regulatory lacunae in public policing, the ob-
servation is all the more true with private police, who may be organization-
ally inclined to turn towards a private justice system more often than to the
criminal justice system. The lesson from this distinction is that the imposi-
tion of increased control of private police behavior, if borrowing from
criminal procedure law, must incorporate the understanding of these quali-
tative differences.
Likewise, the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule to private police
organizations means that public police may find private help advantageous
for their own purposes. Public police, like all employees in complex or-
362 Marx, supra note 117, at 183.
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ganizations, work with the incentives and rules as they best understand
them.363 It would be hardly surprising to discover that the newest version of
the silver platter doctrine is enacted frequently. Can we fault the public po-
lice as corrupt or unethical for taking best advantage of legal rules that
courts repeatedly affirm?
A second aspect of the rules governing public police conduct poses a
more basic problem that is unlikely to yield to easy resolution. Because the
most significant rules controlling the public police only exist with the iden-
tification of state involvement, private police have thus far been exempt
from their application. Judicial inquiry into the existence of state involve-
ment is mainly superficial; formal deputization is often determinative. The
nature and extent of state involvement in private police work, however,
cannot be reduced to absence or presence. Rather, state action exists as a
matter of degree in most cases, or more inelegantly, in a state of "continu-
umization." 364 As Part II discussed, public involvement in private policing
can be so pervasive and multiform that not only does the state action doc-
trine appear highly formalistic, the very meaningfulness of private and pub-
lic seem questionable.365 State action is probably the most difficult to sort
out in the emerging public-private partnerships.
Of course, none of this means that either arrest or government in-
volvement is insignificant. The state can wield considerable power in peo-
ple's lives, and arrest is indeed the beginning of a protracted contest be-
tween the defendant and the state. Nor does anyone suggest that private
police are resolving by themselves violent crimes such as murder or rape.
What I have attempted to show here, however, is that the nearly exclusive
focus on the power of the state and the significance of arrest obscures the
importance of other means police, and especially the private police, have at
their disposal.
The muddling of the private-public distinction in policing represents
but one example of the more general decline of this legal distinction. 366 But
363 Cf SKOLNICK, supra note 18, at 174 (observing that the response of detectives to
clearance rates can be explained by the following insight: "the worker always tries to per-
form according to his most concrete and specific understanding of the control system").
364 Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1349, 1352 (1982) ("Continuumization means that people see most entities (in-
stitutions, actors, actions) as 'not absolutely one thing or another,' rather than reserving this
status for a small class of intermediate terms, or collapsing everything into one pole or the
other.").
365 Cf Theodore M. Becker, The Place of Private Police in Society: An Area of Research
for the Social Sciences, in SOC. PROB. 21 (1974).
366 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1423, 1428 (1982) (observing that "[p]rivate power began to become increas-
2004]
ELIZABETH E. JOH
abstractions do not interest the police. The law separating private and pub-
lic has little practical significance to the public police, who by social and
institutional arrangements, often work with private police agencies. Where
the distinction does matter, through the application of the exclusionary rule
to their work, this Part has pointed out that the structure of the private-
public divide permits (and perhaps encourages) exploitation of the separate
legal regimes. Because they blur boundaries, partnerships raise the ques-
tion of which source of law is appropriate. Finally, even if state action
could be imputed to the private police, it is far from clear that the arrest-
centered model of regulation that governs public policing would be a sensi-
ble mechanism for them.
The law offers private police agencies relative freedom compared to
their public counterparts to maintain order and control crime. The existing
rules from criminal and tort law are probably adequate to address private
police scandals: those cases in which private police assault, discriminate
against, or otherwise mistreat people. But the focus here has been on the
relative paucity of rules designed to regulate the routine work of private po-
lice in the pursuit of their objectives. The contemporary regulation of polic-
ing carries with it an ironic paradox: the rules governing the two police
groups grow ever more distinct, particularly as criminal procedure grows in
complexity, yet the practical experiences of the two groups continue to
grow closer together, and in the case of partnerships, merge so closely that
it becomes difficult to say what is private and what is public.
IV. CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE "POLICE" AND "POLICING"
Who may lay legitimate claim to being the "police"? After all, the
word "police" has no natural definition or fixed content. Many people out-
side of the state once assumed primary responsibility for the tasks we now
associate with the (public) police. Today, the private police, by their con-
siderable and pervasive presence, raise new challenges to the definition and
function of policing. The existence of basic data on the private police re-
ingly indistinguishable from public power precisely at the moment, late in the nineteenth
century, when large-scale corporate concentration became the norm"); Kennedy, supra note
363, at 1357 (observing that we live in an era in which the distinction cannot be taken "seri-
ously as a description, as an explanation, or as a justification of anything"); Donald R.C.
Pongrace, Sterotypification of the Fourth Amendment's Public/Private Distinction: An Op-
portunity for Clarity, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1191, 1210 (1985) (describing public-private dis-
tinction in law as a "logical bankruptcy"). Policing is only one area in which scholars have
questioned the public-private distinction. For insightful critiques of the public-private divide
as it pertains to the family and the market, see Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market:
A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983); Nikolas Rose, Be-
yond the Public/Private Division: Law, Power and the Family, 14 J. L. & Soc'Y 61 (1987).
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mains inadequate, and a scholarly treatment underdone. This insufficient
attention is striking because of the ever greater reliance placed upon private
police organizations to act as partners, supplements, or independent agents
in controlling crime, maintaining order, and, today, combating the threat of
terrorism.
This latter point is all the more striking because of the differential legal
treatment private and public police receive. The actual convergence of the
two groups and their divergence in law creates legal anomalies at the
boundary line between what are the largely "constitutionalized" set of rules
controlling the public police, and the amalgam of laws cobbled together
from property, tort, and contract law controlling private police behavior.
No uniform solution can address these problems. Should courts rec-
ognize an expansive notion of state action? Should lawmakers retreat from
advocating partnerships? There are likely a number of possible responses,
and unlikely a single, comprehensive agenda that will answer all of these
questions. My modest goal has been to draw empirically supported atten-
tion to the divide between the social realities and the legal conception of the
private police. Confrontation of that issue, whether by judicial, legislative,
or political means, must draw upon a solid basis of research and scholarship
on private police organizations.
Scholars of criminal procedure and of the (public) police have much to
offer here, but their concerns must be redirected. Much of the scholarship
on policing has not only ignored the private police, 367 it pays little attention
to some fundamental questions that are now, ironically, being raised in the
marginalized scholarship on private policing. Much public police scholar-
ship today is highly instrumental, or as Austin Sarat and Susan Silbey might
describe, is subjected to the "pull of the policy audience." 368 In other
words, the study of the (public) police focuses upon questions pertaining to,
for example, the improvement of patrol response rates and the identification
of effective crime reduction techniques. These concerns, while certainly
valuable, now overshadow issues like the definition of policing itself, and
the appropriate mix of private and public policing in a democratic society.
Moving private policing from periphery to center in the study of the "po-
367 See Maureen Cain, Trends in the Sociology of Police Work, 7 INT'L J. Soc. L. 143,
145 (1979) ("Nobody [in conventional policing scholarship] questioned what 'the police'
meant. Thus private police forces, citizen protection groups, and other government policing
bodies, were ignored.").




lice" not only draws attention to a much overlooked subject, 369 it asks again
and with a new perspective foundational questions that once animated study
of the police and the law, and should once more.
369 See Becker, supra note 365, at 450 (advocating a "new perspective.., whereby re-
searchers are 'sensitized' to the existence and importance of private police in society").
[Vol. 95
THE PARADOX OF PRIVATE POLICING
APPENDIX: RESEARCH METHODS
The case study of the "T Company" Protection Department, described
in Part II, draws from observation of and interviews with a private policing
department located in a large city of the Eastern United States. I discuss
here the research methods adopted and some of the obstacles encountered.
The difficulty of researching private policing cannot be underesti-
mated. It is in some ways more difficult than the study of the public police,
about which numerous scholars have complained. Those who have con-
ducted ethnographic research of the public police have repeatedly remarked
upon the extreme reluctance of the police in providing information to out-
siders. 370 Given that many private police executives are former public po-
lice officers, it should come as little surprise that I encountered considerable
difficulty-in fact, almost no cooperation at all-in obtaining interviews
with other private police organizations that I approached. I chose to study
T company primarily because I was able to gain access to its director, and
consequently was able to obtain permission to conduct observations. The
public police department responsible for providing T company with off-
duty officers, however, repeatedly denied my requests for interviews. Had
it not been for a personal connection that provided me an opportunity to
meet with its directors, first N.K, and then S.R., I almost certainly would
have failed to complete the case study.
The research was conducted in two periods. In February of 1998, I in-
terviewed the management of the Protection Department, and spent several
day shifts observing its operations, especially by shadowing A.M., one its
"investigators." In July 2000, I returned to the Department for a period of
discontinuous observation that lasted four weeks, during which I was per-
mitted to observe T company's policing operations. I alternated my obser-
vation periods between the early morning-day shifts, and the day-evening
shifts. By the time of my second period of observation, T company had
changed its leadership, and its new director, S.R., allowed me continue my
observations on the condition that I not reveal the identity of the company
or its location.
370 Thus, for example, Paul Chevigny notes of the New York Police Department:
It must be admitted that the NYPD is difficult to study. Bureaucratized as it is, it turns a bland
face to the public as well as to scholars. Everything has to be done through channels; hardly
anyone in the department will talk to an outsider without approval from above, and once the ap-
proval is obtained, hardly anything of substance is revealed.
PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE 33 (1995).
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In order to supplement my observations, I interviewed the private sec-
tor liaison of the local public police department, and attended three meet-
ings of the private-public alliance sponsored by the public police depart-
ment. To gain a sense of comparison, I also interviewed the management of
another private police department located in the same city as T Company.
The findings presented in Part II may suffer from several shortcom-
ings. Some will fairly question the extent to which the case study is repre-
sentative of other private policing operations. Case studies are a well-
established method of research in contemporary sociology, 371 particularly in
the study of the public police.372 What case studies gain in richness of
knowledge they may also lose something in their potential for generalizabil-
ity. 373 The successful case study can, however, provide other researchers
with working propositions that can be further explored in other settings.374
As to these concerns, I suggest that my study of the T Company Protection
Department is illustrative, rather than representative in a truly scientific
sense, of the kinds of empirical complexity I suggest exists in private polic-
ing, and of the thorny problems that remain inadequately addressed by the
law.
375
Another limitation to be considered is the extent to which my presence
altered or influenced the behavior of those I observed. To this end, I can
say that I attempted in all respects to be as unobtrusive as possible. Never-
theless, those I spoke to and observed were no doubt more cautious in their
working behavior than they otherwise would be. Occasionally, a seemingly
casual conversation would end with the remark, "and you can put that in
your book."
My descriptions sometimes place the department I studied in unflatter-
ing terms; nevertheless, I believe my observations to be accurate. I do not,
however, wish to suggest that any of the people I describe deliberately or
371 See generally WHAT IS A CASE?: EXPLORING THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL INQUIRY
(Charles C. Ragin & Howard S. Becker eds., 1992).
372 See, e.g., ERICSON, supra note 44 (conducting a five month study of Canadian police
department); WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., POLICE: STREETCORNER POLITICIANS (1977) (conducing
interviews with twenty-eight officers in Laconia); see also RIGAKOS, supra note 18, at 29
(2002) (conducting a two month study of a Canadian private police company).
373 See NICHOLAS ABERCROMBIE ET AL., DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 41 (4th ed. 2000).
374 See Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms,
and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REv. 643, 647 n.17 (2001) (describing the advantages of
case studies).
375 See also NEWBURN & JONES, supra note 26, at 118 (stating that their case study of
Wandsworth was "illustrative rather than representative," and that its "worth lies more in the
depth and quality of the data that can be collected, rather than the extent to which one could
argue that what is observed there is necessarily transferable elsewhere").
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consciously behaved in inappropriate or illegal ways. Indeed, the staff of T
Company was overwhelmingly composed of individuals dedicated to what
they believed was the pursuit of a safe and orderly environment. Instead,
my intention has been to describe the activities of this department to illus-
trate general issues in private policing that arise out of the socio-legal
framework in which it operates.
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